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1 Introduction
An agent faces a decision-making problem under uncertainty. After observing a signal that is
informative about an unknown state of the world, the agent chooses an action. Since the agent’s
choice depends on the signal realization she receives, from the perspective of an uninformed
observer, the agent’s optimal action is an endogenously determined random variable.
In this paper, we characterize how the quality of the agent’s signal affects the induced
distribution of her optimal action. We consider a setting in which the agent prefers to take
higher actions for higher states of the world. When the agent’s signal becomes more informative
about the unknown state, her posterior beliefs become more dispersed. We characterize under
what conditions a more dispersed distribution of posterior beliefs leads to (i) a more dispersed
distribution of actions, and (ii) a higher or lower mean of the optimal action. Our character-
ization elucidates the mechanism behind the familiar result that a mean-preserving spread in
posterior beliefs leads to a mean-preserving spread of actions in the case of quadratic payoffs
and Gaussian signals.1 Moreover, our characterization extends the same intuition to allow for
changes in the mean as well as more general payoff functions and signal structures.
In various settings, the agent’s action not only affects her own payoff but also the payoff
of other economic agents. For example, in games of incomplete information, an agent’s action
affects the payoff of all other players. Since the quality of the agent’s signal affects the distri-
bution of her optimal action, it also affects the (ex-post) payoff distribution of such third-party
agents, thereby generating informational externalities. We apply our comparative statics results
on the distribution of actions to study these informational externalities.
To concretely motivate our question, consider a monopolist facing a linear demand curve
P (q) = 1 − q and a quadratic cost function c(θ, q) = (1 − θ)q + q2/2, where q is the quantity
produced and θ ∈ [0, 1] is a cost parameter. Higher values of θ correspond to lower marginal
costs. Consequently, the monopolist would like to produce more as θ increases.
However, the cost parameter is an unobserved random variable that is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval. The monopolist instead observes a signal such that with probability
ρ ∈ [0, 1], the signal realization s matches the realized state of the world (s = θ), and with
probability 1 − ρ, the signal realization s is uniformly drawn from the unit interval and inde-
pendent from the state variable. The quality of the signal is increasing in ρ: When ρ = 0, the
signal is uninformative; when ρ = 1, the signal is fully revealing.
From an “interim” perspective, a monopolist that observes a signal realization s when the
1See Mas-Colell et al. (1995), Section 6.D.2, for a definition of mean-preserving spreads.
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signal quality is ρ optimally produces
qM(s; ρ) =
E[θ]
3
+ ρ
(
s− E[θ]
3
)
.
The first term on the right-hand-side is the quantity the monopolist produces based only on
the prior. The second term reflects how the monopolist adjusts her production decision based
on what she learns from observing a signal realization s ∈ [0, 1].
From the perspective of an uninformed third party, the optimal quantity is a random
variable whose distribution is given by
H(z; ρ) = P({s : qM(s; ρ) ≤ z}),
the probability that the monopolist optimally produces at most z units given a signal of quality
ρ. Our goal in this paper is to characterize how H(·; ρ) changes when ρ increases. Will the
optimal quantity produced increase or decrease on average when ρ increases? Will the quantities
produced become more dispersed? In Section 2.5, we tackle these questions for more general
utility functions and information structures (signals). However, in this example, we can answer
these questions by using the closed-form solution of qM .
Suppose the quality of the monopolist’s information structure increases from ρ′ to ρ′′ > ρ′.
“Good news” (s > E[θ]) from ρ′′ provides a stronger evidence of high values of θ than “good
news” from ρ′. As a result, the monopolist produces more when she observes “good news” from
ρ′′ than when she observes “good news” from ρ′. Symmetrically, “bad news” (s < E[θ]) from
ρ′′ provides a stronger evidence of low values of θ than “bad news” from ρ′. As a result, the
monopolist produces less when she observes “bad news” from ρ′′ than when she observes “bad
news” from ρ′. In either case, the monopolist makes more extreme decisions when the quality
of her information increases.
In Figure 1(a), the rotation of the solid line, qM(·; ρ′), to the dashed line, qM(·; ρ′′), captures
the more extreme production decision due to an increase in the quality of information. This in
turn induces a mean-preserving spread in the distribution H, as shown by the density function
h, in Figure 1(b). Thus, as the monopolist’s signal becomes more informative, the distribution
of quantities becomes more dispersed while the average quantity produced remains unaffected.
Notice, however, that the result makes heavy use of the monopolist’s quadratic profit function
and the “truth-or-noise” signal, both of which make the problem tractable.
In this paper, we characterize how an increase in the quality of information affects the
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distribution of optimal actions in a general model with supermodular payoffs. We present
(i) an order over the distributions of optimal actions that captures changes in the mean and
dispersion, (ii) an order over information structures that captures quality, and (iii) conditions
on payoff functions that lead to an equivalence between the two orders.
Consider a third-party who holds preferences over the decision-maker’s actions, and has to
choose between two information structures, ρ′ and ρ′′.2 We say the agent is more responsive
with a higher mean under ρ′′ than under ρ′ if any risk-loving third-party prefers the distribution
of optimal actions induced by ρ′′. Alternatively, we say the agent is more responsive with a
lower mean under ρ′′ than under ρ′ if any risk-averse third-party prefers the distribution of
optimal actions induced by ρ′. Loosely, responsiveness with a higher mean corresponds to
higher variability and higher actions on average (increasing convex stochastic order) while
responsiveness with lower mean corresponds to higher variability but lower actions on average
(second-order stochastic dominance).
To compare the quality of information structures, we first restrict attention to a class of
structures in which higher signal realizations lead to first-order stochastic shifts in posterior
beliefs. The restriction is weaker than the common assumption that signals are ordered by
the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). Within this restricted class of experiments,
we then use the monotone information order (Athey and Levin, 2017) to capture quality.3
Intuitively, information structure ρ′′ dominates information structure ρ′ in the monotone infor-
mation order if the signals from ρ′′ are more correlated with the state than are the signals from
ρ′.
Our main result shows that if ρ′′ dominates ρ′ in the monotone information order, then an
agent, whose payoff function exhibits a supermodular and convex (in actions) marginal utility,
is more responsive with a higher mean under ρ′′ than under ρ′. Furthermore, we show that if
an agent is more responsive with a higher mean under ρ′′ than under ρ′ for all payoff functions
that exhibit supermodular and convex marginal utilities, then ρ′′ necessarily dominates ρ′ in
the monotone information order.
Intuitively, a supermodular payoff function implies that the agent “benefits from matching”
her actions to the state, i.e, taking higher actions for higher states of the world and lower
actions for lower states. When a payoff function additionally exhibits a supermodular and
2In the monopoly example, the third-party could be a social planner who has preferences over the quantity
produced by the monopolist. More broadly, we can think of the third-party and the decision-maker as the
“sender” and “receiver” in a Bayesian persuasion framework a` la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
3The monotone information order is equivalent to the supermodular stochastic ordering and the positive
dependence ordering when the state is one-dimensional.
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convex marginal utility, the agent’s “benefit from matching” is non-diminishing as her action
increases.4 A consequence is that the agent’s optimal action, as a function of her posterior
beliefs, is convex. When the agent’s quality of information increases, the distribution of her
posterior beliefs becomes more dispersed, which in conjunction with a convex optimal action,
leads to a more dispersed distribution of actions with a higher mean.
We also present symmetric results linking responsiveness with a lower mean to payoff func-
tions with a submodular and concave marginal utility. Furthermore, we provide an example
in which a higher quality of information does not lead to a more dispersed distribution of ac-
tions when the agent’s payoff function violates the conditions on the marginal utility. As an
application, we reconsider the monopolist example in a more general setting and study how
a social planner can regulate the quality of the monopolist’s information in order to improve
social welfare.
We then extend our comparative statics results to Bayesian games with strategic comple-
mentarities. We consider a setting in which different players receive private signals of varying
quality about the underlying state of the world before playing a game. Similar to the single
agent case, under conditions on the players’ marginal utilities, we show that a higher signal
quality for any one player leads to a more dispersed distribution of Bayesian Nash equilibrium
actions along with an increase or decrease in the mean equilibrium actions for all players.
Our comparative statics results point out a more intricate interaction between a player’s
equilibrium strategy and the quality of information than has been previously studied. First, we
generalize the observation in linear-quadratic games that a player’s best-response becomes more
dispersed when that player’s own signal becomes more informative. Second, when one player’s
signal becomes more informative about the state, it also becomes (weakly) more correlated
(unconditional on the state) to other players’ signals. Due to strategic complementarities,
a higher quality of information about each others’ signal realizations, and thereby actions,
implies a more dispersed distribution of best-responses. Third, a player’s ex-post desire to
match the actions of other players implies that the player has ex-ante incentives to match the
distribution of actions of other players. Hence, a player’s best-response becomes more dispersed
if another player’s distribution of actions becomes more dispersed. Our main result shows that
the culmination of these three effects is that players are not only responsive to changes in the
quality of their own signals but also to changes in the quality of their opponent’s signals.
4This does not imply that the agent has a non-diminishing marginal utility. Instead, it implies that the
marginal gains from matching actions to states dominates the rate at which the marginal utility diminishes. See
the discussion following Proposition 1.
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The results are fruitful for studying informational externalities in Bayesian games, such as
differentiated Bertrand competition and coordination games, under general payoff functions and
information structures. For instance, we show that full information sharing between partners
in a joint project is optimal without assuming a quadratic payoff function or Gaussian signals.
As an application of our methodology, we then study endogenous information acquisition in
Bayesian games with two players. The game is composed of two stages: only player 1 acquires
information in the first stage followed by a second stage in which both players choose actions
simultaneously. Whether or not player 2 observes player 1’s choice of information corresponds to
overt and covert information acquisition games respectively. We define the value of transparency
as the difference in the ex-ante payoffs to player 1 between the overt and the covert games and
we show how responsiveness is useful to characterize it. Specifically, we show that the value of
transparency is positive or negative depending on (i) the responsiveness of player 2 to player
1’s information quality, and (ii) the sign of the externality on player 1 imposed by player 2’s
action. This in turn has implications on how much information player 1 acquires in the two
games.
1.1 Related Literature
Two papers closely related to ours are Jensen (2018) and Lu (2016). Jensen considers a decision-
maker who has complete information about the state of the world. His paper characterizes how
changes in the distribution over the state of the world affect the induced distribution over
optimal actions.5 In our setting, the decision-maker does not observe the state and the prior
distribution over the state is held fixed. Instead, we characterize how changes to the information
structure affect the distributions over the posterior beliefs which, in turn, affect the distribution
over optimal actions. Lu studies how information acquisition affects choice from a menu. In
particular, he shows that a decision-maker has a more dispersed willingness-to-pay for any given
menu if the quality of information increases. We instead show that the choice from within a
menu becomes more dispersed as the quality of information increases.6
This paper also contributes to the literature on monotone comparative statics and the
value of information. In the monotone comparative statics literature, our paper is closest to
Athey (2002) who characterizes when optimal actions increase as a function of beliefs. We
5In the context of our motivating example, the monopolist observes the state θ and optimally produces
quantity qM (θ). Jensen’s paper characterizes how different distributions over θ affect the distribution of qM (θ).
6Note that there cannot be any meaningful dispersion in choice of action from within a singleton menu.
However, the willingness-to-pay for the singleton menu can vary depending on the decision-maker’s belief.
6
take the next step and show how the distribution of optimal actions changes as a function of
the distribution over beliefs.7 Our work also relates to literature on the value of information:
Blackwell (1951, 1953), Lehmann (1988), Persico (2000), Quah and Strulovici (2009), and Athey
and Levin (2017). In particular, Athey and Levin show that in the class of payoff functions
that exhibit complementarities between actions and states, an agent values more information
if, and only if, information quality is increasing in the monotone information order. Our results
differ from theirs in that we show in the subclass of payoff functions that exhibit supermodular
and convex/submodular and concave marginal utilities, the agent’s optimal actions are more
dispersed if, and only if, information quality is increasing in the monotone information order.
Our comparative statics results for Bayesian games with strategic complementarities are
also related to monotone comparative statics of equilibrium actions studied by Vives (1990),
Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Villas-Boas (1997), Van Zandt and Vives (2007), as well as the
value of information in Bayesian supermodular games studied by Amir and Lazzati (2016).
Amir and Lazzati is particularly noteworthy as they show that in supermodular games, a
player values more information if information quality is increasing in the monotone information
order. Similar to the single agent case, our results differ in that our comparative statics focuses
on the distribution of equilibrium actions. We show that in a subclass of supermodular games,
the equilibrium actions for all players become more dispersed if information quality for any one
player increases in the monotone information order.
Finally, our analysis of the value of transparency in Bayesian games is related to the char-
acterization of strategic investment in sequential versus simultaneous games of complete infor-
mation in Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985). We
defer a detailed discussion of the relationship to Section 4.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we present the single
agent framework, and provide sufficient and necessary conditions for an agent to become more
responsive as information quality increases. We extend the analysis to Bayesian games with
strategic complementarities in Section 3. In Section 4, we present an application to overt and
covert information acquisition games and analyze the value of transparency in Bayesian games.
Section 5 concludes. Proofs that are not presented in the text are in the Appendix.
7In the context of our motivating example, Athey (2002) provides comparative statics results on qM (s; ρ) as
a function of the signal realization s for a fixed ρ. We instead provide comparative statics results for the entire
mapping qM (·; ρ) as a function of ρ.
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1.2 Preliminary Definitions and Notation
Let Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and Y be compact subsets of R. Let X , ×mi=1Xi be the Cartesian
product endowed with the product order so that for x′, x ∈ X, x′ ≥ x if, and only if, x′i ≥ xi
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Let x′ ∨ x denote the join of x′ and x, the component-wise maximum, and
let x′ ∧ x denote the meet of x′ and x, the component-wise minimum.
A function g : X → R is supermodular (submodular) if g(x′∨x)+g(x′∧x) ≥ (≤)g(x′)+g(x)
for all x, x′ ∈ X. We say that g is modular if it is both supermodular and submodular. We
use the terms ‘increasing’, and ‘decreasing’ in the weak sense, for example, we say a function
f : Y → R is increasing if y′ > y implies f(y′) ≥ f(y). We will be explicit when we refer to
strict monotonicity. A function h : X × Y → R has increasing (decreasing) differences in (x; y)
if for x′ ≥ x, h(x′, y)− h(x, y) is increasing (decreasing) in y.
For a differentiable function, g : X → R, we write gxi(x) as a shorthand for ∂∂xi g(x) and
gxixj(x) for
∂2
∂xixj
g(x). If g is differentiable and supermodular, then gxixj ≥ 0 for all i 6= j.
2 Single-agent Model
Let A , [a, a¯] be the action space and let Θ , [θ, θ¯] represents the state space. Let ∆(Θ)
denote the set of all Borel probability measures on Θ. An agent (she) has to choose an action
a ∈ A before observing the realized state of the world θ ∈ Θ. The agent’s prior belief is denoted
by the measure µo ∈ ∆(Θ). We allow for beliefs to be discrete measures with a finite support
in Θ or absolutely continuous measures on Θ. Payoffs are given by the function u : Θ×A→ R
such that
(A.1) u(θ, a) is uniformly bounded, measurable in θ, and twice differentiable in a,
(A.2) for all θ ∈ Θ, u(θ, ·) is strictly concave in a with uaa(θ, ·) < 0,
(A.3) for all θ ∈ Θ, there exists an action a ∈ A such that ua(θ, a) = 0, and
(A.4) u(θ, a) is supermodular.
Supermodularity implies that the agent prefers a high action when the state is high and a
low action when the state is low. Assumptions (A.1)-(A.3) allow us to characterize the optimal
actions by their first order conditions. In Section 2.4, we discuss the difficulties that arise when
some of these assumptions are violated.
Given any belief µ ∈ ∆(Θ), define
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a∗(µ) = arg max
a∈A
∫
Θ
u(θ, a)µ(dθ).
The compactness of A and the continuity of the utility function guarantee that the solution
exists and is measurable. Furthermore, Athey (2002) shows that (A.4) implies a∗(µ2) ≥ a∗(µ1)
whenever µ2 FOSD µ1.8
Prior to decision-making, the agent can observe an informative signal about the unknown
state. Signals are generated by an information structure Σρ , 〈S, F (·, ·; ρ)〉 where S ⊆ R is a
compact interval, F (·, ·; ρ) : Θ×S → [0, 1] is a joint probability distribution given by F (θ, s; ρ),
and ρ is an index that is useful when comparing multiple signal structures.
For any information structure Σρ, the marginal of F (·, ·; ρ) on Θ, denoted by FΘ, must
satisfy FΘ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
µo(dω). We denote the marginal of F (·, ·; ρ) on S by FS(ρ). Without loss
of generality, we assume that all information structures have the same marginal on the signal,
i.e., FS(s; ρ) = FS(s) for all s ∈ S and any Σρ. Moreover, FS has a positive bounded density
fS.
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2.1 Order over Distributions of Optimal Actions
From an interim perspective of the decision problem, the agent first observes signal realization
s ∈ S from information structure Σρ, updates her beliefs to a posterior µ(·|s; ρ) ∈ ∆(Θ) via
Bayes rule, and then chooses the optimal action a∗
(
µ(·|s; ρ)). Define the measurable function
a(ρ) : S → A given by a(s; ρ) = a∗(µ(·|s; ρ)).
From an ex-ante perspective, the signal realizations are yet to be observed. Therefore, the
optimal actions induced by an information structure Σρ are random variables. In particular,
a(ρ) is a random variable that is distributed according to H(·; ρ) defined as
H(z; ρ) , FS
({s : a(s; ρ) ≤ z})
8For any two beliefs µ1, µ2 ∈ ∆(Θ), we say that µ2 first-order stochastically dominates µ1, denoted µ2 FOSD
µ1, if for any increasing function g : Θ→ R,
∫
Θ
g(θ)µ2(dθ) ≥
∫
Θ
g(θ)µ1(dθ).
9The assumption is without loss of generality: we can apply the integral probability transform to any signal
with a continuous marginal distribution FS(ρ) and create a new signal which is uniformly distributed on the
unit interval. The transformed signal still conveys the same information as the original signal. If FS(ρ) is
discontinuous, then, as noted by Lehmann (1988), we can construct a new equally informative signal with a
continuous marginal by appropriately distributing the mass at discontinuity points.
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for z ∈ R. The quantile function is defined as
aˆ(q; ρ) = inf{z : q ≤ H(z; ρ)}
for q ∈ (0, 1).
Our goal is to characterize how information quality affects the distribution of optimal
actions. Thus, the first step is to identify an order over distributions of optimal actions that
appropriately captures changes in the mean and dispersion of actions.
Given two information structures Σρ′ and Σρ′′ , we say that a(ρ
′′) dominates a(ρ′) in the
decreasing convex order if, for any decreasing convex function φ : R→ R∫ ∞
−∞
φ(z)dH(z; ρ′′) ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
φ(z)dH(z; ρ′).
In other words, a(ρ′′) dominates a(ρ′) in the decreasing convex order if any risk-averse third-
party with utility function −φ(·) prefers a(ρ′).
Alternatively, we say that a(ρ′′) dominates a(ρ′) in the increasing convex order if, for any
increasing convex function ϕ : R→ R∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(z)dH(z; ρ′′) ≥
∫ ∞
−∞
ϕ(z)dH(z; ρ′).
In other words, a(ρ′′) dominates a(ρ′) in the increasing convex order if any risk-loving third-
party with utility function ϕ(·) prefers a(ρ′′). Note that if a(ρ′′) dominates a(ρ′) in both the
decreasing convex and increasing convex order, then a(ρ′′) is a mean-preserving spread of a(ρ′).
Responsiveness: Given two information structures Σρ′ and Σρ′′ , we say that
i. an agent is more responsive with a lower mean under Σρ′′ than under Σρ′ if, and only
if, a(ρ′′) dominates a(ρ′) in the decreasing convex order, and
ii. an agent is more responsive with a higher mean under Σρ′′ than under Σρ′ if, and
only if, a(ρ′′) dominates a(ρ′) in the increasing convex order.
In other words, the agent is more responsive under information structure Σρ′′ than under Σρ′
if the information she receives from Σρ′′ leads the agent to take more varied actions. The
definition of responsiveness connects an agent’s behavior under different informational sources
to changes in the dispersion and expectation of the agent’s optimal action. As a short hand,
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we say the agent is responsive if she is either more responsive with a higher mean or more
responsive with a lower mean.
Lemma 1 below provides equivalent characterizations of responsiveness. The first equiva-
lence provides an alternate definition by comparing the distribution functions of the optimal
actions. The second equivalence characterizes responsiveness as a comparison of the quantile
functions. These alternative definitions are particularly useful when the optimal actions are
monotone in the signal realization, a natural consequence when payoffs are supermodular and
beliefs are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance.
Lemma 1 (Shaked and Shantikumar, 2007; Theorem 4.A.2-3)
Given two information structures Σρ′ and Σρ′′, the following are equivalent:
i. An agent is more responsive with lower mean under Σρ′′ than under Σρ′.
ii. For all x ∈ R, ∫ x
−∞
H(z; ρ′)dz ≤
∫ x
−∞
H(z; ρ′′)dz.
iii. For all t ∈ [0, 1], ∫ t
0
aˆ(q; ρ′)dq ≥
∫ t
0
aˆ(q; ρ′′)dq.
Similarly, the following are equivalent:
iv. An agent is more responsive with higher mean under Σρ′′ than under Σρ′.
v. For all x ∈ R, ∫ ∞
x
H(z; ρ′′)dz ≤
∫ ∞
x
H(z; ρ′)dz.
vi. For all t ∈ [0, 1], ∫ 1
t
aˆ(q; ρ′′)dq ≥
∫ 1
t
aˆ(q; ρ′)dq.
Figure 2 below plots the distribution over actions induced by two information structures Σρ′
and Σρ′′ . In Figure 2(a), the area between the y-axis and H(ρ
′′) (the dashed curve) is smaller
than that of H(ρ′) (the solid curve) which implies the mean of the optimal actions induced by
Σρ′′ is lower than the mean induced by Σρ′ . Furthermore, integrating H(z; ρ
′) − H(z; ρ′′) left
to right always yields a negative value which, by Lemma 1.ii, implies responsiveness with a
lower mean. In contrast, in Figure 2(b), the area between the y-axis and H(ρ′′) is bigger than
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that of H(ρ′) which implies the mean of the optimal actions induced by Σρ′′ is larger than the
mean induced by Σρ′ . Furthermore, integrating H(z; ρ
′)−H(z; ρ′′) right to left always yields a
positive value which, by Lemma 1.v, implies responsiveness with a higher mean.
H(ρ′)
1
H(ρ′′)
H
z
(a) Responsiveness with a lower
mean
1
H(ρ′)
H(ρ′′)
H
z
(b) Responsiveness with a higher
mean
Figure 2: CDF of Optimal Actions and Responsiveness
2.2 The Monotone Information Order
The next step is to determine an appropriate way to compare different information structures.
We first restrict attention to information structures in which higher signal realizations lead
to a first-order stochastic increase in beliefs. This assumption is weaker than the monotone
likelihood ratio property commonly assumed in settings with complementarities.
(A.5) For any given information structure Σρ, s
′ > s implies µ(·|s′; ρ) FOSD µ(·|s; ρ).
Monotone Information Order: Σρ′′ dominates Σρ′ in the monotone information order,
denoted ρ′′ MIO ρ′, if for all q ∈ [0, 1]
µ
( · |FS(s) ≥ q; ρ′′) FOSD µ( · |FS(s) ≥ q; ρ′)
and
µ
( · |FS(s) ≤ q; ρ′) FOSD µ( · |FS(s) ≤ q; ρ′′).
Intuitively, when ρ′′ MIO ρ′, the signal and the state are more positively correlated under
Σρ′′ than under Σρ′ , and consequently, the agent updates her beliefs more “aggressively” under
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Σρ′′ . More formally, by (A.5), high signal realizations are evidence of high states. The agent
considers a signal realization above the qth quantile from Σρ′′ as a stronger evidence that the
state could be high (than a signal realization above the qth quantile from Σρ′). Consequently,
the agent is more optimistic when she observes a signal realization above the qth quantile from
Σρ′′ than from Σρ′ . Similarly, a signal realization below the q
th quantile from Σρ′′ is a stronger
evidence that the state could be low (than a signal realization below the qth quantile from Σρ′).
Thus, the agent is more pessimistic when she observes a signal realization below the qth quantile
from Σρ′′ than from Σρ′ .
Example 1: Truth-or-Noise signals
To avoid confusion, let (θ˜, s˜) be the random variables representing the state and the signal while
(θ, s) represent typical realizations of the random variables. Σρ belongs to a class of information
structures such that with probability ρ ∈ [0, 1], the signal reveals the state (s˜ = θ˜), and with
probability 1− ρ, the signal and the state are identically and independently distributed. Thus,
with probability 1− ρ, the signal is uninformative. Then, ρ′′ MIO ρ′ if ρ′′ > ρ′.
Example 2: Normal prior and signals:
Σρ belongs to a class of information structures such that the state and the signal are multivariate
normally distributed random variables with[
θ˜
s˜
]
∼ N
([
θ0
θ0
]
,
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
])
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the correlation coefficient between the two normally distributed variables.
Hence, given a signal realization s, the agent’s posterior is given by
θ˜|s ∼ N
(
ρs+ θ0(1− ρ), 1− ρ
)
When ρ increases, the agent’s posterior (i) places more weight on the observed signal as evi-
denced by the shift in the mean and (ii) reduces the variance in the agent’s posterior. Then,
ρ′′ MIO ρ′ if ρ′′ > ρ′.
In the Appendix, we discuss why the monotone information order is the relevant order to
consider when characterizing responsiveness. We also elaborate how the monotone information
order compares to the more familiar Blackwell informativeness (Blackwell, 1951, 1953) or the
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Lehmann (accuracy) order (Lehmann, 1988).10
2.3 Monotone Information Order and Responsiveness
The main contribution of this paper is to identify a class of decision problems for which the
agent becomes more responsive when information quality increases according to the monotone
information order. Let U↑ be the class of payoff functions u : Θ×A→ R that satisfy (A.1)-(A.4)
and have a marginal utility ua(θ, a) that is
i. convex in a for all θ ∈ Θ, and
ii. supermodular in (θ, a).
Below, we show that an agent with a payoff function u ∈ U↑ becomes more responsive with a
higher mean (hence the up arrow) as information quality increases in the monotone information
order.
Let U↓ be the class of payoff functions u : Θ× A→ R that satisfy (A.1)-(A.4) and have a
marginal utility ua(θ, a) that is
i. concave in a for all θ ∈ Θ, and
ii. submodular in (θ, a).
Below, we show that an agent with a payoff function u ∈ U↓ becomes more responsive with a
lower mean (hence the down arrow) as information quality increases in the monotone informa-
tion order.
Theorem 1 Consider two information structures Σρ′ and Σρ′′ that satisfy (A.5). Σρ′′ domi-
nates Σρ′ in the monotone information order if, and only if, an agent with any payoff u ∈ U↑[
u ∈ U↓], is more responsive with a higher [lower] mean under Σρ′′ than under Σρ′.
Intuitively, the higher the quality of the agent’s information, the more aggressively she
updates her belief. Thus, when information quality increases in the monotone information
order, the agent’s posterior beliefs becomes more dispersed. Theorem 1 provides the conditions
on the agent’s utility function under which we can map the more dispersed distribution of
posterior beliefs to a more dispersed distribution of actions that incorporates monotone changes
10See Persico (2000) and Jewitt (2006) for detailed description and applications. Definitions can be found in
the Appendix.
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to the mean optimal action. The mechanism behind Theorem 1 is best understood through
Proposition 1 below, which shows that a payoff function u ∈ U↑ [u ∈ U↓] leads to optimal
actions that are “convex” [“concave”] in the agent’s posterior belief. We then show how this
convexity/concavity interacts with the quality of information to result in more dispersed actions.
Proposition 1 Let µ1, µ2 ∈ ∆(Θ) be any two beliefs with µ2 FOSD µ1. If u ∈ U↑, then for
any λ ∈ [0, 1]
a∗
(
λµ1 + (1− λ)µ2
) ≤ λa∗(µ1) + (1− λ)a∗(µ2)
If u ∈ U↓, the opposite inequality holds.
Proof. Let ai = a
∗(µi) for i = 1, 2, aλ = λa1 + (1 − λ)a2, and µλ = λµ1 + (1 − λ)µ2. By the
first order condition, we have that
∫
Θ
ua(θ, ai)µi(dθ) = 0. Let u ∈ U↑.∫
Θ
ua(θ, aλ)µλ(dθ) ≤ λ
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a1)µλ(dθ) + (1− λ)
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a2)µλ(dθ)
= λ2
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a1)µ1(dθ) + (1− λ)2
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a2)µ2(dθ)
+ λ(1− λ)
[∫
Θ
ua(θ, a2)µ1(dθ) +
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a1)µ2(dθ)
]
= λ(1− λ)
∫
Θ
[ua(θ, a1)− ua(θ, a2)] (µ2(dθ)− µ1(dθ))
≤ 0
where the first inequality follows from the convexity of ua. As already noted, supermodularity of
the utility u(θ, a) along with µ2 FOSD µ1 implies a2 ≥ a1. By supermodularity of the marginal
utility ua, we have ua(θ, a1) − ua(θ, a2) is a decreasing function of θ. The last inequality then
follows from the definition of first-order stochastic dominance. Since the marginal value of aλ
is non-positive at µλ, we must have a
∗(µλ) ≤ aλ. A symmetric argument establishes that if
u ∈ U↓, then a∗(µλ) ≥ aλ.
Henceforth, we focus on payoffs in U↑ but the arguments we provide can be symmetrically
applied to payoffs in U↓. To see the intuition behind the additional assumptions on the utility
functions in U↑, consider a “ revision” process by which an agent starts at some arbitrary action
aˆ ∈ A and adjusts this action as the state changes. Supermodularity of u implies that the state
and the action are complements, i.e., for two states θ > θ′, the difference in the marginal utility
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ua(θ, a) − ua(θ′, a) is non-negative. Therefore, the agent is willing to adjust aˆ upwards as the
state increases.
However, supermodularity of u does not tell us anything about the strength of the comple-
mentarities between the action and the state. It could be that complementarities are negligible
for low actions but substantial for high actions. In such a case, the agent’s payoff addition-
ally satisfies increasing supermodularity, i.e., ua(θ, a)− ua(θ′, a) is non-negative and increasing
in a. Therefore, if aˆ is small, ua(θ, aˆ) − ua(θ′, aˆ) is also small and the agent is only willing
to adjust aˆ upwards by a negligible amount as the state increases. Conversely, if aˆ is large,
ua(θ, aˆ) − ua(θ′, aˆ) is also large and the agent is willing to adjust aˆ upwards by a substantial
amount.
On the other hand, the concavity of the agent’s payoff function implies that she has a
diminishing marginal utility. An agent who starts the “revision” process at a small aˆ is more
willing to increase her action than an agent who starts at a high aˆ. Thus, there are two opposing
forces at work. When the agent’s payoff u belongs to U↑, the rate at which her marginal utility
diminishes is less than the rate at which the complementarities between her action and the
state increase.
For a simple visual representation, let the state space be Θ = {θ, θ¯} with θ¯ > θ. With
some abuse of notation, let µ = P(θ = θ¯) ∈ [0, 1] represent the agent’s belief that θ = θ¯.
Consider four different beliefs {µi}i=1,2,3,4 such that, µi+1 = µi + δ for some δ > 0. Figure
3(a) below plots out the expected marginal utility of a payoff function u ∈ U↑ for the different
beliefs. Since the payoff is concave in a, the marginal utilities are downward sloping. The
optimal action a∗(µi) is given by the action at which the expected marginal utility under belief
µi intersects the x-axis. Since µ4 > µ3 > µ2 > µ1, the beliefs are ordered by first-order
stochastic dominance with µ4 FOSD µ3 FOSD µ2 FOSD µ1. Supermodularity implies that
the expected marginal utility of µi always lies below the expected marginal utility of µi+1. Thus,
a∗(µ4) ≥ a∗(µ3) ≥ a∗(µ2) ≥ a∗(µ1).
Furthermore, increasing supermodularity implies that the gap between the expected marginal
utilities of µi+1 and µi is widening as the action increases. We capture this by showing that
the height of the red arrows increases left to right. Finally, the marginal utilities themselves
are convex curves which implies that the marginal utility diminishes at a diminishing rate. All
these properties combined result in a∗(µ4)−a∗(µ3) > a∗(µ3)−a∗(µ2) > a∗(µ2)−a∗(µ1). Figure
3(b) depicts this “convexity” property as described in Proposition 1.
To see how the “convexity” of the optimal action is related to responsiveness, let us continue
with the above simplified setting with two states. Let µo ∈ (0, 1) be the agent’s prior belief
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Figure 3: Convexity for u ∈ U↑
that the state is θ¯ and let Σρ′ be a completely uninformative information structure. Then, Σρ′
induces a∗(µo) with probability one.
Let Σρ′′ be an information structure that induces two posteriors {µ1, µ2} with probability
{λ, 1−λ}. Without loss of generality, assume µ2 > µ1 which implies µ2 FOSD µ1. Consistency
of Bayes-updating implies µo = λµ1 + (1 − λ)µ2. Σρ′′ induces optimal actions a∗(µ1) with
probability λ and a∗(µ2) with probability 1 − λ. Furthermore, given the supermodularity of
u(θ, a) and µ2 FOSD µ1, a∗(µ2) ≥ a∗(µ1).
From Proposition 1, if u ∈ U↑, then λa∗(µ1)+(1−λ)a∗(µ2) ≥ a∗(λµ1 +(1−λ)µ2) = a∗(µo).
In Figure 4(a) below, the average action from the more informative structure Σρ′′ is given by
the point on the dashed line directly above µo while the average action from the uninformative
structure Σρ′ is given by the point on the solid curve directly above µo.
Figure 4(b) maps the induced distribution over optimal actions. The dashed line, H(ρ′′),
maps the distribution of actions under Σρ′′ with a mass of size λ at a
∗(µ1) and another mass
of size 1− λ at a∗(µ2). Similarly, the solid line, H(ρ′), maps the distribution of actions under
Σρ′ which places all the mass at a
∗(µo). Notice the integral
∫∞
x
H(z; ρ′′) − H(z; ρ′)dz ≤ 0 for
all x ∈ R which implies, by Lemma 1.v, that the agent is more responsive with a higher mean
under Σρ′′ than under Σρ′ .
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Figure 4: Convexity of a∗ and responsiveness with higher mean
2.4 Non-responsive Optimal Actions
In this section, we explore why a higher quality of information may not lead to more responsive
optimal actions when u /∈ U↑ ∪ U↓. Once again, let the state space be Θ = {θ, θ¯}. Consider
four different beliefs {µi}i=1,2,3,4 such that µi+1 = µi + δ for some δ > 0. Once again, beliefs are
ordered by first-order stochastic dominance with µ4 FOSD µ3 FOSD µ2 FOSD µ1.
Figure 5 below shows why increasing supermodularity alone is not sufficient to get the con-
vexity property from Proposition 1. In Figure 5(a), we plot the expected marginal utilities of
some payoff function u. Notice that supermodularity still holds − the expected marginal utility
of µi lies below the expected marginal utility of µi+1. Thus, a
∗(µi+1) ≥ a∗(µi). Furthermore,
increasing supermodularity still holds − the height of the red arrows increases left to right.
However, the marginal utilities are now concave which implies that the marginal utility dimin-
ishes at an accelerating rate. Hence, u /∈ U↑. Furthermore, a∗(µ4) − a∗(µ3) < a∗(µ3) − a∗(µ2)
whereas a∗(µ3) − a∗(µ2) > a∗(µ2) − a∗(µ1). Figure 5(b) depicts this “non-convexity” of the
optimal action as a function of beliefs.
Figure 6 below illustrates why the agent may not be responsive to an increase in the quality
of information when the optimal action is neither convex nor concave, as in Figure 5(b). Let
Σρ′′ be an information structure that induces three posteriors {µ1, µo, µ2} with equal probability
such that µ2 FOSD µo FOSD µ1. Let Σρ′ induce posteriors {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4} with probability
{1/6, 1/6, 1/3, 1/3} such that µ4 FOSD µ3 FOSD µ2 FOSD µ1. Notice that Σρ′ is a garbling
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Figure 5: Non-convexity for u /∈ U↑
of Σρ′′ and thus, ρ
′′ MIO ρ′.11
Let a∗(µ) be neither convex nor concave and let the average action under Σρ′′ equal the
average action under Σρ′ . In Figure 6(a) below, this corresponds to the point of intersection of
the dashed line and the solid curved line at µo. Figure 6(b) maps the distribution over optimal
actions. Σρ′′ induces the dashed line while Σρ′ induces the solid line. If we start integrating from
the right, then
∫∞
x
H(z; ρ′′) − H(z; ρ′)dz ≤ 0 for all x > a∗(µ4) but the sign changes at some
point x∗ ∈ (a∗(µo), a∗(µ4)). If we integrate from the left, then
∫ x
−∞H(z; ρ
′′) − H(z; ρ′)dz ≥ 0
for all x < a∗(µ3) but the sign changes at some point x∗∗ ∈ (a∗(µ3), a(µo)).
11A garbling is a kernel Q : S × S → [0, 1] so that F (s′|θ; ρ′) = ∫
s∈S Q(s
′|s)dF (s|θ; ρ′′)
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Figure 6: Non-convexity/concavity and non-responsiveness
We can therefore conclude that the agent is neither more responsive with a higher mean nor
more responsive with a lower mean. In fact, as the average action under Σρ′′ equals the average
action under Σρ′ , we can conclude that a(ρ
′′) and a(ρ′) cannot be ordered by most univari-
ate stochastic variability orders such as second-order stochastic dominance, mean-preserving
spreads, Lorenz order, dilation order, and dispersive order.12
Another reason why a higher quality of information may not lead to more responsiveness
is when the interior solution assumption, (A.3), is violated. Suppose the upper limit on the
action space, a¯, is a binding constraint for the prior, i.e., a∗(µo) = a¯. Let Σρ′ be a completely
uninformative information structure. Then, Σρ′ induces a¯ with probability one, thereby first-
order stochastically dominating the distribution over actions induced by any other information
structure Σρ′′ , even if ρ
′′ MIO ρ′.
2.5 Application: Pigouvian Subsidies and Monopoly Production
In the Introduction, we considered the effect of information quality on a monopolist’s production
decision in a highly stylized example. In this section, we consider the example in a more general
setting as follows: a monopolist who produces q ∈ [0, q¯] faces a downward sloping inverse
demand curve P (q) and a cost function c(θ, q) where the parameter θ ∈ Θ is unknown. The
monopolist holds a prior µo ∈ ∆(Θ). As θ increases, the marginal cost declines, i.e. c(θ, q)
is submodular in (θ, q). We assume that the monopolist’s profit pi(θ, q) = qP (q) − c(θ, q) is
12Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007) provide a thorough treatment of these orders.
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strictly concave in q and admits an interior solution for each θ.
Prior to making any production decisions, the monopolist can acquire an information struc-
ture from a set of experiments {Σρ}ρ∈R at cost κ(ρ). We assume the experiments are totally or-
dered by the monotone information order so that ρ′′ > ρ′ implies ρ′′ MIO ρ′ and κ(ρ′′) ≥ κ(ρ′).
Consider a social planner who is unable to regulate prices or quantities but can influence the
quality of information the monopolist acquires. For example, the social planner may subsidize
the monopolist’s cost of information acquisition or place a cap on the quality of information
that can be acquired. Should the social planner encourage of discourage information acquisition
by the monopolist?13
Given a choice of information structure Σρ and a signal realization s ∈ S, the monopolist
updates her belief to the posterior µ(·|s; ρ) and produces the monopolist optimal quantity
qM(s; ρ). Thus, the monopolist’s ex-ante problem is to choose an information structure that
maximizes ∫
S
∫
Θ
pi
(
θ, qM(s; ρ)
)
µ(dθ|s; ρ)dFS(s)− κ(ρ).
In contrast, the social planner takes the consumer surplus into account. Let CS(q) be
the consumer surplus when the monopolist produces q. The planner’s ex-ante payoff given an
information structure Σρ is given by∫
S
∫
Θ
pi
(
θ, qM(s; ρ)
)
µ(dθ|s; ρ)dFS(s) +
∫
S
CS
(
qM(s; ρ)
)
dFS(s)− κ(ρ).
Thus, the planner has a higher demand for information than the monopolist if a higher quality of
information increases the expected consumer surplus, i.e., information is a positive externality
on the consumer even if the unknown parameter θ has no direct effect on consumer welfare.
Proposition 2 Let −qP ′′(q)/P ′(q) ≤ 1 and let the profit function pi ∈ U↑. Then the social
planner has a higher demand for information than the monopolist.
Intuitively, the assumption that −qP ′′(q)/P ′(q) ≤ 1 implies that as production increases,
the consumers capture more and more of the welfare gains than does the monopolist. Therefore,
the consumer surplus is a convex function of the quantity produced, which in turn implies that
consumers benefit as the monopolist’s production becomes more responsive with higher mean.
From Theorem 1, we get the desired responsiveness behavior when pi ∈ U↑.
13Athey and Levin (2017) consider a similar porblem. However, in their application, the planner can regulate
prices/quantities as well as the quality of information.
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3 Supermodular Games
In this section, we extend our results from the single-agent framework to supermodular games
with incomplete information. This class of games includes beauty contests, oligopolistic com-
petition, games with network effects, search models, and investment games. It is useful to
understand how information quality affects the equilibrium of these games in a general setting.
3.1 Setup
There are n players with N , {1, 2, . . . , n} denoting the set of players. Let Θi , [θi, θ¯i] be the
state space for player i. Let Θ = ×i∈NΘi and Θ−i = ×j 6=iΘj . The players hold a common prior
µo ∈ ∆(Θ). Let FΘi : Θi → [0, 1] be the marginal on Θi and FΘ−i(·|θi) : Θ−i → [0, 1] be the
joint distribution on Θ−i conditional on state θi ∈ Θi induced by µo. Once again, we allow for
beliefs to be discrete measures with finite support in Θ, absolutely continuous, or a mixture.
Additionally, we assume that
(A.6) for all i ∈ N , θ′i > θi implies FΘ−i(·|θ′i) FOSD FΘ−i(·|θi)
which is a weaker assumption than affiliation. Notice that our setup accommodates games of
independent or common values.
Let Ai , [ai, a¯i] be the action space of player i. Let A = ×i∈NAi and A−i = ×j 6=iAj. The
payoff for each player i = 1, ..., n is given by a utility function ui : Θi × A→ R such that
(A.7) ui(θi, a) is uniformly bounded, measurable in θi, continuous in a, and twice differentiable
in ai,
(A.8) for all (θi, a−i) ∈ Θi × A−i, ui(θi, a−i, ·) is strictly concave in ai,
(A.9) for all (θi, a−i) ∈ Θi × A−i, there exists an action ai ∈ Ai such that uiai(θi, a−i, ai) = 0,
and
(A.10) ui(θ, a) has increasing differences in (θi, a−i; ai).
Similar to the single-agent framework, (A.10) implies that there are complementarities
between the state of the world and a player’s action. Additionally, there are now strategic
complementarities between the players’ actions. Thus, when player j takes a higher action,
player i wants to do the same.
Following the terminology introduced by Bergemann and Morris (2016), we decompose the
entire game of incomplete information into two components: the basic game and the information
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structure. The basic game G , (N, {Ai, ui}i∈N , µo) is composed of (i) a set of players N , (ii)
for each player i ∈ N , an action space Ai along with a payoff function ui : Θi × A → R, and
(iii) a common prior µo ∈ ∆(Θ).
The second component of the Bayesian game is the information structure Σρ = ×i∈NΣρi
where for each player i = 1, ..., n, signals are generated by Σρi ,
(
Si, F (ρi)
)
. Si ⊆ R is a
compact signal space, F (ρi) : Θi×Si → [0, 1] is a joint probability distribution over Θi×Si given
by F (θi, si; ρi), and ρi is an index.
14 Let FSi(ρi) : Si → [0, 1] be the marginal on Si. Once again,
we assume without loss of generality that for any information structure Σρi , FSi(si; ρi) = FSi(si)
for all si ∈ Si. Moreover, FSi has a positive and bounded density fSi .
Let S = ×i∈NSi. An information structure Σρ induces a joint distribution over Θ×S which
we denote by F (θ, s; ρ). The following are working assumptions for this section:
(A.11) For all s ∈ S and θ ∈ Θ, F (s|θ; ρ) = ∏i∈N F (si|θi; ρi).
(A.12) For all players i ∈ N , s′i > si implies µ(·|s′i; ρi) FOSD µ(·|si; ρi).
(A.13) For all players i ∈ N , θ′i > θi implies F (·|θ′i; ρi) FOSD F (·|θi; ρi).
Assumption (A.11) implies that player i can directly learn about θi but cannot directly
learn about other players’ states, θ−i, or signal realizations, s−i. Assumption (A.12) is an
extension of (A.5) and implies that higher signal realizations lead to a first-order increase in a
player’s belief. Assumption (A.13) implies the converse: higher states are likely to lead to higher
signal realizations. A distribution over the state and signal space that satisfies the monotone
likelihood ratio property also satisfies (A.12)-(A.13).
The full game of incomplete information is given by Gρ , (Σρ, G). Both components of the
game are common knowledge. First, each player i ∈ N privately observes a signal realization
si ∈ Si generated from Σρi and updates her belief to µ(·|si; ρi) ∈ ∆(Θ). Then, the players
participate in the basic game G by simultaneously choosing an action.
Momentarily ignoring existence issues, let a?(ρ) =
(
a?1(ρ), a
?
2(ρ), . . . , a
?
n(ρ)
)
be a profile
of pure strategy actions that constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game Gρ,
and let a?−i(ρ) be the profile of BNE strategies excluding player i. For each player i ∈ N ,
a?i (ρ) : Si → Ai is a measurable function. We interpret a?i (si; ρ) as the solution to
max
ai∈Ai
∫
Θ×S−i
ui
(
θi, a
?
−i(s−i; ρ), ai
)
dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ).
14There is an implicit assumption in the setup that player i can directly learn only about θi. We make this
assumption explicit in (A.11).
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In words, a?i (si; ρ) is the action player i takes in an equilibrium of the game Gρ when she observes
signal si and her opponents use strategies a
?
−i(ρ). Fixing the basic game G, we are interested
in how a change in the information structure from Σρ′ to Σρ′′ affects the BNEs of the full game
Gρ′ = (Σρ′ , G) and Gρ′′ = (Σρ′′ , G).
We restrict our attention to monotone BNEs, i.e., each player’s equilibrium action, a?i (si; ρ)
is increasing in the signal si.
15 The existence of monotone pure strategy BNE has long been
established by the literature on supermodular Bayesian games. In particular, the existence
result of Van Zandt and Vives (2007) is noteworthy in our setting; their existence result does
not require players to have atomless beliefs when they participate in the basic game G, which is
relevant in our setting as we do not impose any smoothness restriction on the joint distribution
of signals and state.
3.2 Monotone Information Order and Equilibrium Responsiveness
We parallel the single-agent framework as closely as possible. We first extend the responsive-
ness order and the monotone information order into a multi-player setting using the product
order. We then identify the class of payoff functions for which monotone BNE are ordered by
responsiveness when information quality changes according to the monotone information order.
Equilibrium Responsiveness: Given two games of incomplete information Gρ′ and Gρ′′ ,
a?(ρ′′) is more responsive with a higher [lower] mean than a?(ρ′) if, and only if, a?i (ρ
′′) is more
responsive with a higher [lower] mean than a?i (ρ
′) for all i ∈ N .
Monotone Information Order: Given two information structures Σρ′ and Σρ′′ , Σρ′′ domi-
nates Σρ′ in the monotone information order, denoted ρ
′′ MIO ρ′ if, and only if, Σρ′′i dominates
Σρ′i in the monotone information order for all i ∈ N .
Let Γ↑ be the class of payoff functions u : Θi × A → R that satisfy (A.7)-(A.10) and have
a marginal utility uiai(θ, a) that, for all j ∈ N ,
i. is convex in aj for all (θi, a−j) ∈ Θi × A−j,
ii. has increasing differences in in (θi, a−j; aj).
15By assumptions (A.6), (A.10), and (A.12), player i’s best response is monotone in si when her opponents
use monotone strategies. While restricting attention to monotone BNEs may be with loss of generality, extremal
equilibria are nonetheless monotone. Specifically, the least and the greatest pure strategy monotone BNEs of a
supermodular Bayesian game bound all other BNEs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Van Zandt and Vives, 2007).
24
Below, we show that payoffs in Γ↑ are linked to BNE strategies that become more responsive
with a higher mean (hence the up arrow) as information quality increases in the monotone
information order. Similar to the single agent setting, there are increasing complementarities
in (θi, ai) along with a marginal utility that diminishes at a diminishing rate as ai increases.
However, in the multi-player setting, player i faces uncertainty not only from θi but also from the
random actions of her opponents. Hence, we additionally require increasing complementarities
in (θi, a−i) as well as increasing strategic complementarities in (ai, a−i) while maintaining a
marginal utility that diminishes at a diminishing rate as a−i increases.
Let Γ↓ be the class of payoff functions u : Θi × A → R that satisfy (A.7)-(A.10) and have
a marginal utility uiai(θ, a) that, for all j ∈ N ,
i. is convcave in aj for all (θi, a−j) ∈ Θi × A−j,
ii. has decreasing differences in (θi, a−j; aj).
Below, we show that payoffs in Γ↓ are linked to BNE strategies that become more responsive
with a lower mean (hence the down arrow) as information quality increases in the monotone
information order.
Theorem 2 Consider two Bayesian games, Gρ′ , (Σρ′ , G) and Gρ′′ , (Σρ′′ , G) in which Σρ′′
dominates Σρ′ in the monotone information order.
i. Suppose for each player i ∈ N , ui ∈ Γ↑. Then, for any monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium
a?(ρ′) of Gρ′, there exists a monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium a?(ρ′′) of Gρ′′ such that
a?(ρ′′) is more responsive with higher mean than a?(ρ′).
ii. Suppose for each player i ∈ N , ui ∈ Γ↓. Then, for any monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium
a?(ρ′′) of Gρ′′, there exists a monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium a?(ρ′) of Gρ′ such that
a?(ρ′′) is more responsive with lower mean than a?(ρ′).
Each player i faces n sources of uncertainty: the unknown state θi and the random actions
of the remaining n− 1 players which depend on the signal realizations they observe. The proof
for Theorem 2 proceeds in four steps. The first step shows that, holding all else fixed, player
i’s best-reply strategy becomes more responsive when only the quality of information for player
i increases in the monotone information order. As quality of information increases, player i is
more informed about θi. Thus, an application of Theorem 1 from the single-agent setting gives
the result.
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The second step shows that, holding all else fixed, player i’s best-reply strategy becomes
more responsive when the quality of information for player j 6= i increases in the monotone
information order. As player j’s information quality increases, player j’s signals become more
correlated to the state θj, which in turn is (weakly) correlated to θi.
16 Thus, by increasing
the quality of information for player j, the signals for player i and j indirectly become more
correlated. Hence, player i can better predict player j’s random action and match it.
The third step shows that, holding all else fixed, player i’s best-reply strategy becomes
more responsive when player j 6= i chooses a more responsive strategy due to the increasing
differences of uiai in (aj; ai). It is of similar spirit to the result that increasing differences of u
i
in (aj; ai) imply that the best-reply to a monotone opponent’s strategy is monotone. Finally,
we conclude by applying the main result in Villas-Boas (1997) to get a comparative statics of
responsiveness on fixed points.
While the requirements placed on payoff functions may be rather restrictive, we present
some examples of applications in which they are satisfied.
Example 4: Beauty Contest Games
Each player’s payoff is given by
ui(θi, a) = −βi
(
θi − ai
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match the state
−(1− βi)
(∑
j 6=i
aj
n− 1 − ai
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Match average action of others
.
Then, ui ∈ Γ↑ if βi ∈ (0, 1).
Example 5: Joint Projects
n players work on joint risky project which has a return of v(θi) to player i if it succeeds. Each
player’s payoff is given by
ui(θi, a) =
n∏
j=1
aj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of success
× v(θi)︸︷︷︸
Value from success
− ci(ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of effort
Then, ui ∈ Γ↑ if
i. v(θi) is increasing θi
ii. ci(ai) is increasing and convex in ai, and
16By weakly correlated, we mean that we allow for θi to be independent of θj .
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iii. c′i(ai) is concave in ai.
The only additional restriction than the standard assumptions made in most applications is the
concavity of the marginal cost (which is satisfied if the player has quadratic cost).
Remark: In the case of independent private values, we can relax the restriction on Γ↑ to the
class of utility functions ui : Θi×A→ R which satisfy (A.7)-(A.10) and have a marginal utility
uiai(θi, a) that
i. for all j ∈ N , is convex in aj for all (θi, a−j) ∈ Θi × A−j, and
ii. has increasing differences in (θi, a−i; ai).
In games with independent private values (IPV), we do not require the strategic complemen-
tarity between players to increase when the state increases. Essentially, in IPV settings, none
of the information player i acquires from her signal is informative of her opponents’ actions.
Hence, we can drop the increasing differences assumption in (θi, a−j; aj) for j 6= i.
3.3 Application: Information Sharing in Joint Projects
Two players collaborate on a joint project which has an intrinsic common value θ ∈ Θ , [θ, θ¯]
if it succeeds. The value of a failed project is normalized to zero. Each player i = 1, 2 chooses
an effort level ai ∈ [0, 1] and gets a payoff of
ui(θ, a) = a1a2v
i(θ)− ci(ai)
where vi : Θ→ R+ is player i’s private utility from a successful project with vi(·) increasing in
θ, and ci : Ai → R+ is player i’s cost function. We assume that ui ∈ Γ↑ as in Example 5.
Ex-ante, the intrinsic value of the project is unknown and the players have a common prior
µo ∈ ∆(Θ). Prior to participating in the joint project, player 1 observes the value of θ but
player 2 does not.17 Player 1 can share her information with player 2 by choosing an information
structure Σρ. Player 2 observes player 1’s choice of information structure while player 1 cannot
observe player 2’s signal realization.
17The model in which player 1 observes θ is a special case of a more general model where player 1 only
observes a signal s1 which is correlated to θ. Then, we can treat θ as a latent variable while s1 becomes the
relevant “state of the world” with payoffs given by u˜i(s1, a) = a1a2E[v
i(θ)|s1]− ci a
2
i
2 .
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Let P be the set of information structures from which player 1 chooses. We assume that all
information structures in P satisfy A.11-A.13 and that for any two information structures Σρ′ ,
Σρ′′ ∈ P , either ρ′ MIO ρ′′ or vice versa. Let Σρ¯ ∈ P represent the full-information structure.
Each choice of an information structure Σρ defines a Bayesian game Gρ as follows:
Player 1
chooses Σρ ∈ P
Nature picks:
θ ∈ Θ ∼ µo,
s ∈ S ∼ F (s|θ; ρ)
Player 1 privately observes θ,
Player 2 privately observes s
Player i = 1, 2
chooses ai ∈ [0, 1]
Project
succeeds/fails
Information
Stage
Basic game
Let a?(ρ) be a monotone BNE of Gρ with a?1(·; ρ) : Θ → A1 and a?2(·; ρ) : S → A2. We assume
that the players can coordinate on the maximal BNE (the BNE that results in the maximal
effort for each player). Let player 1’s ex-ante BNE payoff be given by
U1(ρ) =
∫
Θ×S
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ), a
?
2(s; ρ)
)
dF (s|θ; ρ)µo(dθ).
How much information, if any, would player 1 want to share with player 2? On the one
hand, player 1 would like to reveal the state to player 2 if θ is high as this would encourage
player 2 to exert effort. In contrast, player 1 would prefer to reveal nothing to player 2 if θ is
low as this would discourage player 2 from exerting effort. Ex-ante, it is not immediately clear
which of these two forces dominates. However, we can use the comparative statics developed
in Theorem 2 to show that it is optimal (within the restricted set of information structures) for
player 1 to reveal the state to player 2.
Proposition 3
It is optimal for player 1 to reveal the state to player 2. Specifically, U1(ρ¯) ≥ U1(ρ) for all
Σρ ∈ P, where Σρ¯ ∈ P is the full-information structure.
The model of joint projects with information sharing is akin to the literature on firm
competition and information sharing which has been explored by a vast literature starting
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with Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Clarke (1983), Vives (1984), Gal-Or (1985, 1986), and
Raith (1996). More recently, Bergemann and Morris (2013) study information sharing in beauty
contests and provide a comprehensive analysis which allows for Bayes correlated equilibrium.
Similar to Proposition 3, full information disclosure has been shown to be optimal for the case
of firm competition with common values and strategic complements. However, the previous
results depended on symmetric linear best-response functions and normally distributed states
and signals so that payoffs and actions could be explicitly computed. Our result in Proposition
3 makes fewer assumptions on payoffs and information structures as we do not need explicit
solutions.
4 Overt vs Covert Information Acquisition and the Value
of Transparency
In this section, we study information acquisition in the context of supermodular Bayesian
games. Specifically, we study how the incentives to acquire information change when informa-
tion acquisition is public (overt) versus when it is private (covert) which allows us to study
the strategic value of acquiring information. We call this strategic element of information ac-
quisition the value of transparency and show that responsiveness is one of the key components
useful in characterizing it.
4.1 Setup
We consider a two-player Bayesian game composed of two stages: an information acquisition
stage followed by a basic game G , ({Ai, ui}i=1,2, µo) where µo ∈ ∆(Θ) satisfies (A.6) and
ui satisfies (A.7)-(A.10) for i = 1, 2. In the information acquisition stage, player 2 has an
exogenously given information structure Σρ2 . On the other hand, player 1 is allowed to choose
an information structure Σρ1 ∈ P where, similar to Section 3.3, P denotes the set of information
structures. Again, we assume that information structures satisfy (A.11)-(A.13), and that for
any two information structures Σρ1 ,Σρ′1 ∈ P , either ρ1 MIO ρ′1 or vice versa. We allow
information acquisition to be costly where we denote the cost of acquiring Σρ1 by κ(ρ1) ∈ R.
Whether or not player 2 observes player 1’s choice of information structure corresponds to
the overt and the covert game respectively. After the information acquisition stage, each player
i = 1, 2 privately observes a signal realization si ∈ Si, updates beliefs, and plays the basic game
by simultaneously choosing an action ai ∈ Ai. Throughout this section, we only consider pure
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strategy information acquisition strategies in the first stage.18 We also assume that players
coordinate on the maximal pure-strategy monotone BNE in the second stage.
To better understand the difference between overt and covert information acquisition, sup-
pose initially that player 1 is endowed with information structure Σρˆ1 ∈ P and this is common
knowledge, i.e., both players know the Bayesian game is Gρˆ = (Σρˆ1 ,Σρ2 , G). Let
(
a?1(ρˆ), a
?
2(ρˆ)
)
be the resulting BNE of Gρˆ. Consider the following two scenarios as a thought experiment.
In the first scenario, player 1 is allowed to choose a different information structure. Player
2 is (a) made aware that player 1 can choose a different information structure, and (b) observes
player 1’s choice. This scenario of the thought experiment mirrors the the overt game. Common
knowledge of information structures still holds; if player 1 chooses Σρ1 ∈ P , the game changes
from Gρˆ to Gρ = (Σρ1 ,Σρ2 , G) and the resulting BNE is
(
a?1(ρ), a
?
2(ρ)
)
.
In the second scenario, player 1 is again allowed to choose a different information structure.
However, player 2 is (a) not aware that player 1 can choose a different information structure,
and (b) does not observe player 1’s choice. This scenario of the thought experiment mirrors the
covert game. Player 2 will ignorantly believe that the game is still Gρˆ and continues to play
a?2(ρˆ), even when player 1 chooses Σρ1 . On the other hand, player 1 best-replies to a
?
2(ρˆ) by
playing the strategy aBR1 (a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ). Henceforth, we refer to ρ = (ρ1, ρ2) as the actual outcome
of the information acquisition stage and ρˆ = (ρˆ1, ρ2) as player 2’s belief of the outcome of the
information acquisition stage, i.e., player 1’s actual choice of information structure is Σρ1 ∈ P
while player 2 believes it is Σρˆ1 ∈ P . We say player 2 has correct beliefs when ρˆ1 = ρ1 (which
must be the case in any equilibrium).
Given actual first stage outcome ρ and player 2’s belief ρˆ, let player 1’s ex-ante payoff in
the covert game (second scenario) be U1(ρ; ρˆ)− κ(ρ1) where
U1(ρ; ρˆ) =
∫
Θ×S
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dF (θ, s; ρ).
In the overt game (first scenario), player 2 has correct beliefs. Hence, given actual first stage
18For overt information acquisition, this is without loss as player 2 observes the outcome of the mixed strategy
before the second stage. Hence, player 1 randomizes only when she is indifferent.
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outcome ρ, player 1’s payoff in the overt game is U1(ρ; ρ)− κ(ρ1) with
U1(ρ; ρ) =
∫
Θ×S
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ, s; ρ)
=
∫
Θ×S
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ, s; ρ),
where the equality follows from aBR1 (a
?
2(ρ), ρ) = a
?
1(ρ) by the definition of a BNE. We define
the value of transparency as the difference in player 1’s ex-ante payoffs between the overt and
covert game.
Value of Transparency: Given actual first stage outcome ρ and player 2’s belief ρˆ, the value
of transparency is given by:
V T (ρ; ρˆ) = U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρ; ρˆ).
In words, V T (ρ; ρˆ) represents the gain/loss to player 1 from disclosing to player 2 her actual
first stage choice, Σρ1 , instead of letting player 2 incorrectly believe that the first stage choice is
Σρˆ1 . Notice that the value of transparency does not capture any direct substantive advantages
of information; player 1’s chosen information structure in both cases is Σρ1 . The difference
between covert and overt stems from player 2’s beliefs about player 1’s quality of information.
4.2 Demand for Information in Overt vs Covert Games
Before we discuss how to characterize the value of transparency, we present why it is an in-
teresting economic concept. In particular, we show that the value of transparency is helpful
in answering the following questions: when is a higher quality of costless but overt informa-
tion acquisition always beneficial to player 1? Does player 1 acquire more information when
information acquisition is overt or when it is covert?
In covert games, the more information player 1 acquires, the more knowledgeable she is
about the unknown state and can make better decisions in the game. Therefore, if information
is costless, the value of a higher quality information in covert games is positive (Neyman; 1989,
Amir and Lazzati; 2016).
While acquiring a higher quality of information has the same positive effect in overt games,
there are additional effects to account for; player 2 can observe how much information player
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1 acquires and respond to it during the basic game. Player 2 may find it optimal to choose an
unfavorable action (punish player 1) in the equilibrium of the second stage whenever player 1
acquires more information in the first stage. If player 2’s unfavorable action is strong enough
on average, player 1’s value of a higher quality information in overt games may be negative
despite becoming more informed.
Proposition 4 below states that this is not the case if the value of transparency is non-
negative whenever player 1 acquires an information structure of higher quality than player 2’s
belief. In other words, player 1 benefits by disclosing to player 2 that the actual choice of
information in the first stage whenever the actual choice is of higher quality than player 2’s
initial belief.
Proposition 4 Let κ be a constant function. For any two information structures Σρ1 ,Σρˆ1 ∈ P,
suppose ρ1 MIO ρˆ1 implies V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0. Then, U1(ρ; ρ) ≥ U1(ρˆ; ρˆ).
Intuitively, player 1’s payoff difference between overtly acquiring Σρ1 versus Σρˆ1 is given by
U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρˆ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of overt information
= U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of transparency
+ U1(ρ; ρˆ)− U1(ρˆ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of covert information
.
The above expression decomposes the value of overtly acquiring a higher quality of information
into the value of covertly acquiring a higher quality of information and the value from disclosing
to player 2 that a higher quality of information has been acquired. The latter effect is the value
of transparency. The value of covert information captures the change in player 1’s payoff when
the quality of information increases from Σρˆ1 to Σρ1 while player 2’s beliefs are held fixed at
Σρˆ1 . Amir and Lazzati (2016) show that the value of covert information in supermodular games
is non-negative whenever ρ1 MIO ρˆ1. Hence, if the value of transparency is also non-negative
whenever information quality increases in the monotone information order, then the value of
overt information is non-negative.
To answer the second question about the demand of information, let Σρc1 and Σρo1 denote
the information structures acquired in equilibrium under covert and overt games. Specifically,
Σρc1 is a solution to
max
Σρ1∈P
U1(ρ; ρ
c)− κ(ρ1).
In words, given player 2 believes player 1 chooses Σρc1 in equilibrium, it is indeed optimal for
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player 1 to choose Σρc1 . In contrast, Σρo1 solves
max
Σρ1∈P
U1(ρ; ρ)− κ(ρ1).
In words, Σρo1 is optimal for player 1 after taking into account that player 2 will observe the
chosen information structure in the first stage and will respond to it in the second stage.
Proposition 5 below show that whenever the value of transparency is non-negative, player 1
acquires more information in overt games than in covert games, regardless of the cost function.
Proposition 5 For any two information structures Σρ1 ,Σρˆ1 ∈ P, suppose V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0 if, and
only if, ρ1 MIO ρˆ1. Then, ρo1 MIO ρc1.
The implicit assumption of a unique equilibrium outcomes in the result above is only made
to simplify exposition. Notice that the antecedent of Proposition 5 implies V T is a single
crossing function, i.e., V T (ρˆ; ρˆ) = 0 and V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0 for any ρ1 MIO ρˆ1. We can there-
fore apply familiar monotone comparative statics tools to show that the solution set for overt
equilibrium maximization problem dominates the solution set for covert equilibrium in the
monotone-information order.
4.3 Characterizing the Value of Transparency
We now discuss how to characterize the value of transparency. We show that the value of
transparency depends on (i.) the responsiveness of player 2’s equilibrium action to changes
in the quality of player 1’s information structure, and (ii.) the externality player 2’s response
imposes on player 1.
Theorem 3 Assume either
i. states are independently distributed across players, or
ii. u1(θ1, a) has increasing differences in (θ1; a2).
Furthermore, suppose u1(θ1, a) is an increasing convex [decreasing concave] function of a2, and
a?2(·) becomes more responsive with a higher [lower] mean as information quality increases in
the monotone information order. Then, for any two information structures Σρ1 ,Σρˆ1 ∈ P,
V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0 if, and only if, ρ1 MIO ρˆ1.
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Notice that both the beauty contest game and the joint project game presented in Example 4
and Example 5 of Section 3 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3. Applying Proposition 5, we
can then conclude that the demand for information in a beauty contest or joint project game
is higher when information acquisition is overt.
To gain some intuition for Theorem 3, recall that V T (ρ; ρˆ) = U1(ρ; ρ)−U1(ρ; ρˆ) is given by∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)− u1(θ1, aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ), a?2(s2; ρˆ))]dF (θ, s; ρ).
By taking a first-order Taylor expansion, we can approximate the value of transparency as
≈
∫
S1
(
a?1(s1; ρ)− aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ)
)∫
Θ×S2
u1a1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ, s2|s1; ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 by first-order condition for optimality
dFS1(s1)
+
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)∫
Θ×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ, s1|s2; ρ)dFS2(s2).
The second term is the interaction of player 2’s responsiveness to changes in player 1’s infor-
mation quality, captured by the difference in a?2(ρ) and a
?
2(ρˆ), and the effect (externality) this
responsiveness has on player 1’s expected payoff, captured by u1a2 . The conditions in Theorem
3 allow us to sign the second expression of the Taylor expansion. For example, if states are
independently distributed across players,∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)∫
Θ×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ, s1|s2; ρ)dFS2(s2)
=
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dFS2(s2)
∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ1, s1; ρ1).
If a?2 becomes more responsive with a higher mean when information quality increases, then∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dFS2(s2) ≥ 0.
The sign for the value of transparency is then pinned down by whether u1a2 ≥ 0 (positive
externalities) or u1a2 ≤ 0 (negative externalities).
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4.4 Relation to Strategic Effects of Investment in Firm Competition
The application of responsiveness to characterize the value of transparency is related to the
taxonomy of strategic behavior in firm competition studied by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984),
and Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985).19 Here we follow the textbook treatment of
Tirole (1988) and only consider the case of entry accommodation in a duopoly under complete
information.
There are two periods and two firms, an incumbent (firm 1) and an entrant (firm 2). In the
first period, the incumbent chooses a level of investment K1 ∈ R, which the entrant observes.
The term investment is used in a very broad sense and can represent, for example, investment
in R&D that lowers the incumbent’s marginal costs or advertising that captures a share of the
market.
In the second period, both firms compete either in quantities (strategic substitutes) or
prices (strategic complements). Let
(
a?1(K1), a
?
2(K1)
)
be the resulting Nash equilibrium of the
second period after the incumbent chose K1 in the first period. The incumbent’s payoff from
choosing an investment level K1 is given by U1
(
K1, a
?
1(K1), a
?
2(K1)
)
.
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) show that the total marginal effect on the incumbent’s payoff
from overtly increasing investment can be decomposed into
dU1
dK1
=
∂U1
∂K1︸︷︷︸
direct effect
+
∂U1
∂a1
da?1
dK1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
by Envelope theorem︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of covert investment
+
∂U1
∂a2
da?2
dK1︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect
.
Increasing the level of investment has a direct effect on the incumbent’s payoff, for example, by
reducing the marginal cost. It also affects the incumbent’s optimal action choice in the second
period, captured by
da?1
dK1
. If the entrant was unable to observe the incumbent’s investment
choice, these would be the only marginal effects to account for when the incumbent increases
investment.
However, since the entrant observes the incumbent’s first period choice ofK1, the investment
also has strategic effects; the entrant’s production/pricing decision is indirectly affected by
K1. This strategic effect depends on how the entrant’s equilibrium strategy responds to an
increase in the level of investment, represented by
da?2
dK1
, and on how the entrant’s actions affect
the incumbent’s payoff. The latter effect is the externality, ∂U
1
∂a2
, the entrant imposes on the
19For a thorough treatment of different examples and applications we recommend Shapiro (1986). For a more
recent treatment using the tools of supermodular games see Vives (2000).
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incumbent.
In our model, the game is one of incomplete information, player 1 is the incumbent, player
2 is the entrant, and the investment level K1 corresponds to the quality of the player 1’s
information structure ρ1. The total effect of increasing overt investment in information from
Σρ1 to Σρˆ1 can be similarly decomposed into
U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρˆ; ρˆ) = U1(ρ; ρˆ)− U1(ρˆ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of covert investment
+U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
strategic effect
.
The value of covert investment (value of covert information) captures how the player 1’s
payoff increase by her ability to make better informed decisions while holding the player 2’s
strategy fixed. The strategic effect in our model corresponds to the value of transparency.
It captures how player 1’s payoff changes when the player 2’s strategy is indirectly affected
by the change in information quality. From the first-order Taylor expansion, we have shown
that the strategic effect of information (value of transparency) depends on the responsiveness
of player 2’s equilibrium strategy, a?2(ρ), and the average externalities imposed on player 1
by player 2’s responsiveness. Hence, our characterization of the value of transparency can be
thought of as a stochastic extension to the characterization of strategic effects of investment
by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). Generally, characterizing strategic effects of investment in a
stochastic environment is a more involved exercise as it requires characterizing the change to
the entire distribution of equilibrium outcomes as investment increases. However, we were able
to overcome these difficulties by applying the comparative statics we developed in Section 3 for
supermodular games.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we add to the literature on comparative statics in several directions. First,
we conceptualize the ex-ante perspective in which the optimal actions of a decision maker are
endogenous random variables. A natural question then is how to compare optimal actions as the
quality of the information changes. We introduce the notion of responsiveness and characterize
how it captures changes in the mean and dispersion of actions.
We show that when payoffs exhibit increasing supermodularity, optimal actions become
more responsive when the quality of information increases. The conditions can be interpreted
as measuring the relative strength of the complementarity between actions and states. Fur-
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thermore, we extend our results to games of incomplete information with strategic complemen-
tarities to show that monotone Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies become more responsive
when the quality of information increases for at least one player.
In the final section we introduce the value of transparency which captures the strategic
effects of information in overt (public) vs covert (private) information acquisition games. We
show that the concept of responsiveness is a useful tool to characterize the value of transparency
which, in turn, has implications on the value and demand for information when information
acquisition is overt.
We expect that the methods of ‘ex-ante comparative statics’ will be specially fruitful when
studying Bayesian persuasion with restricted information structures, signal jamming games,
rational inattention, firm competition, and search.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs from Section 2
The following alternative characterizations of the monotone information order will prove useful
for the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 2 Given two information structures Σρ′ and Σρ′′, ρ
′′ MIO ρ′ if, and only if,
i. For all (θ, s) ∈ Θ× S,
F (θ, s; ρ′′) ≥ F (θ, s; ρ′).
ii. For all integrable supermodular functions ψ : Θ× S → R,∫
Θ×S
ψ(θ, s)dF (θ, s; ρ′′) ≥
∫
Θ×S
ψ(θ, s)dF (θ, s; ρ′)
Proof. Fix any (θ, s) ∈ Θ× S. Let FS(s) = q.
F (θ, s; ρ′′)− F (θ, s; ρ′) =
∫ s
−∞
∫ θ
θ
(
µ(dω|x; ρ′′)− µ(dω|x; ρ′)
)
dFS(x)
=
(∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|x ≤ s; ρ′′)−
∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|x ≤ s; ρ′)
)
FS(s)
=
(∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|x ≤ F−1S (q); ρ′′)−
∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|x ≤ F−1S (q); ρ′)
)
q
=
(∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|FS(x) ≤ q; ρ′′)−
∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|FS(x) ≤ q; ρ′)
)
q.
We then have
ρ′′ MIO ρ′ ⇔ µ(·|FS(x) ≤ q; ρ′) FOSD µ(·|FS(x) ≤ q; ρ′′)
⇔
(∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|FS(x) ≤ q; ρ′′)−
∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|FS(x) ≤ q; ρ′)
)
q ≥ 0
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giving us the desired result. By Bayes consistency, we also have∫ ∞
s
∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|x; ρ′′)dFS(s) ≤
∫ ∞
s
∫ θ
θ
µ(dω|x; ρ′)dFS(s).
Lemma 2.ii follows from Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002), Theorem 3.9.5.
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof.
( =⇒ ) The payoff u(θ, a) is supermodular in (θ, a) and the information structure Σρ has the
property that s > s′ implies µ(·|s; ρ) FOSD µ(·|s′; ρ). From monotone comparative statics, the
optimal action a(ρ) : S → A is a monotone function of s. Hence, from an ex-ante perspective,
the optimal action coincdes with the quantile function we used to define responsiveness in
Lemma 1, i.e., a(ρ) = aˆ(ρ) almost surely.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the marginal on signals is uniformly distributed on
the unit interval.20 For any two information structures ρ′′ MIO ρ′′ and any signal realization
s ∈ [0, 1], the first order conditions imply that∫
Θ
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′′))µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)−
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′))µ(dθ|s; ρ′) = 0
which we rewrite as∫
Θ
(
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′′))− ua(θ, a(s; ρ′))
)
µ(dθ|s; ρ′′) +
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′))
(
µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)− µ(dθ|s; ρ′)
)
= 0
If u ∈ U↑, then ua(θ, a) is convex in a for all θ. Thus,
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′′))− ua(θ, a(s; ρ′)) ≥ uaa(θ, a(s; ρ′))
(
a(s; ρ′′)− a(s; ρ′))
and(
a(s; ρ′′)− a(s; ρ′)
)∫
Θ
uaa(θ, a(s; ρ
′))µ(dθ|s; ρ′′) +
∫
Θ
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′))
(
µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)− µ(dθ|s; ρ′)
)
≤ 0.
20As mentioned in the text, we can apply the integral probability transformation to signals.
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For each t ∈ [0, 1],∫ 1
t
(
a(s; ρ′)− a(s; ρ′′))ds
≤
∫ 1
t
(
−
∫
Θ
uaa(θ, a(s; ρ
′))µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,B(s)
)−1 ∫
Θ
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′))
(
µ(dθ|s; ρ′)− µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)
)
ds
=
∫
[0,1]×Θ
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′))B(s)−11[s≥t]
(
µ(dθ|s; ρ′)− µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)
)
ds,
where 1[s≥t] is the indicator function that equals 1 if s ≥ t and 0 otherwise.
Define ψ(θ, s; t) , ua(θ, a(s; ρ′))B(s)−11[s≥t]. For any θ > θ′, ψ(θ, s; t)−ψ(θ′, s; t) = 0 for s < t
and
ψ(θ, s; t)− ψ(θ′, s; t) = B(s)−1
(
ua(θ, a(s; ρ
′))− ua(θ′, a(s; ρ′))
)
≥ 0
for s ≥ t. The inequality follows from the supermodularity of u in (θ, a) and the strict concavity
of u in a. Since u ∈ U↑, ua is also supermodular in (θ, a), i.e., ua(θ, a)− ua(θ′, a) is increasing
in a. Since a(s; ρ′) is increasing in s, ua(θ, a(s; ρ′))− ua(θ′, a(s; ρ′)) is also increasing in s.
Additionally, u ∈ U↑ implies that −ua is submodular in (θ, a) and concave in a. Hence,
−uaa(θ, a) is decreasing in both θ and a. Since higher signal realizations lead to higher actions
and to first-order stochastic shifts in beliefs,
−
∫
Θ
uaa(θ, a(s; ρ
′))µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)
is a decreasing function of s. Thus B(s)−1 is increasing in s. We can therefore conclude that
ψ(θ, s; t)−ψ(θ′, s; t) is increasing in s. In other words, ψ(θ, s; t) is supermodular in (θ, s). Thus,
for each t ∈ [0, 1], ∫ 1
t
(
a(s; ρ′)− a(s; ρ′′))ds
≤
∫
[0,1]×Θ
ψ(θ, s; t)
(
µ(dθ|s; ρ′)− µ(dθ|s; ρ′′)
)
ds ≤ 0
where the last inequality follows from the characterization of monotone information order in
Lemma 2.
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(⇐=) From Lemma 2, if ρ′′ MIO ρ′, there exists a (θ∗, s∗) ∈ Θ× [0, 1] such that
F (θ∗, s∗; ρ′′) < F (θ∗, s∗; ρ′).
Define a payoff function
u(θ, a) = −1
2
(
a¯− 1[θ≤θ∗](a¯− a)− a
)2
.
The payoff u(θ, a) satisfies (A.1)-(A.4): It is continuous, twice differentiable, and strictly con-
cave in a for each θ ∈ Θ. It is supermodular in (θ, a). For each θ ∈ Θ, the optimal action
is easily computed from the first order conditions so that the optimal action under complete
information is a if θ ≤ θ∗ and a¯ otherwise.
Furthermore, the marginal utility ua(θ, a) = a¯− 1[θ≤θ∗](a¯− a)− a is
i. linear in a for all θ ∈ Θ
ii. modular in (θ, a).
Therefore, u ∈ U↑⋂U↓.
For any given Σρ, notice that
a(s; ρ) =a¯− (a¯− a)E [1[θ≤θ∗]|s; ρ]
=a¯− (a¯− a)
∫ θ∗
θ
µ(dω|s; ρ).
Then given Σρ′and Σρ′′ , ∫ s∗
0
(
a(s; ρ′′)− a(s; ρ′))dFS(s)
=(a¯− a)
(
F (θ∗, s∗; ρ′)− F (θ∗, s∗; ρ′′)
)
> 0.
Therefore, a(ρ′′) is not more responsive with a lower mean than a(ρ′).
Notice that for any Σρ,
E[a(ρ)] = a¯− (a¯− a)
∫ 1
0
∫ θ∗
θ
µ(dω|s; ρ)dFS(s) = a¯− (a¯− a)
∫ θ∗
θ
µo(dω).
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Thus, ∫ 1
t∗
(
a(s; ρ′′)− a(s; ρ′))dFS(s)
=
∫ 1
0
(
a(s; ρ′′)− a(s; ρ′))dFS(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−
∫ t∗
0
(
a(s; ρ′′)− a(s; ρ′))dFS(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 < 0
and thus, a(ρ′′) is not more responsive with a higher mean than a(ρ′).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. −qP ′′(q)/P ′(q) ≤ 1 implies that CS(q) = ∫ q
0
P (t)dt − qP (q) is an increasing convex
function. If pi ∈ U↑, an increase in ρ (higher quality of information by MIO) leads to an optimal
action qM(ρ) that is more responsive with a higher mean. By definition of responsiveness with
a higher mean, E[CS(qM(ρ))] is increasing in ρ.
6.2 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. To simplify exposition, let n = 2. Once again, we assume without loss of generality that
for each player i = 1, 2, the marginal on signals, FSi , is the uniform distribution on the unit
interval. Fix a Bayesian game Gρ. For each player i, let αi : Si → Ai be an arbitrary measurable
and monotone strategy. Let Ai be the set of all such monotone and measurable strategies and
let A = A1 ×A2. Given opponent strategies α−i ∈ A−i, let aBRi (α−i, ρ) : Si → Ai be player i’s
best response strategy. Specifically,
aBRi (si;α−i, ρ) = arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
Θ×S−i
ui
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
)
dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ).
By (A.6), (A.10), and (A.11)-(A.13), aBRi (α−i, ρ) ∈ Ai for i = 1, 2.21
For any given arbitrary monotone strategies α ∈ A, denote the profile of best-response strategies
by aBR(α, ρ) , {aBRi (α−i, ρ)}i=1,2. Then, a BNE of Gρ, a?(ρ), is given by the fixed point
aBR(a?(ρ), ρ) = a?(ρ).
21By the monotonicity of the best response, aBRi is equivalent to the quantile function almost everywhere.
We can thus directly use aBRi to characterize responsiveness by applying Lemma 1.
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The proof to Theorem 2 proceeds in four steps:
1. Player i’s best response strategy increases in responsiveness when player i’s information
quality increases (Lemma 3)
2. Player i’s best response strategy increases in responsiveness when player −i information
quality increases (Lemma 4)
3. Player i’s best response strategy increases in responsiveness when player −i’s strategy
increases in responsiveness (Lemma 5)
4. Given 1-3, apply comparative statics on fixed points to get desired result.
We only prove the case for ui ∈ Γ↑. A symmetric argument establishes the result for the case
of ui ∈ Γ↓.
Lemma 3 Fix some arbitrary strategy α−i ∈ A−i. Consider two information structures (Σρ′i ,Σρ−i)
and (Σρ′′i ,Σρ−i) with ρ
′′
i MIO ρ′i. If ui ∈ Γ↑, then aBRi (α−i, ρ′′i , ρ−i) is more responsive with a
higher mean than aBRi (α−i, ρ
′
i, ρ−i).
Proof. Given Σρ−i and α−i ∈ A−i, let
u˜i(θi, ai) =
∫
Θ−i×S−i
ui
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
)
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)dFΘ−i(θ−i|θi)
and notice that
aBRi (si;α−i, ρi, ρ−i) = arg max
ai∈Ai
∫
Θi
u˜i(θi, ai)dFΘi(θi|si; ρi).
We have mapped this problem to the single-agent framework where the payoff is given by
u˜i : Θi × Ai → R. Thus, if u˜i ∈ U↑, then aBRi (α−i, ρ′′i , ρ−i) is more responsive with a higher
mean than aBRi (α−i, ρ
′
i, ρ−i) by Theorem 1.
First, notice that u˜i(θi, ai) inherits the measurability, boundedness, and smoothness properties
of ui. In particular uiai,ai(θi, a−i, ai) < 0 for all (θi, a−i) ∈ Θi×A−i implies that u˜iai,ai(θi, ai) < 0
for all θi ∈ Θi. Similarly, uiai(θi, a−i, ai) is convex in ai for all (θi, a−i) ∈ Θi × A−i implies that
u˜iai(θi, ai) is convex in ai for all θi ∈ Θi.
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To see supermodularity of u˜i, let θ′i > θi. Then,
u˜iai(θ
′
i, ai)− u˜iai(θi, ai)
=
∫
Θ−i×S−i
uiai
(
θ′i, α−i(s−i), ai
)
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)dFΘ−i(θ−i|θ′i)
−
∫
Θ−i×S−i
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
)
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)dFΘ−i(θ−i|θi)
=
∫
Θ−i×S−i
(
uiai
(
θ′i, α−i(s−i), ai
)
− uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
))
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)dFΘ−i(θ−i|θ′i)
+
∫
Θ−i×S−i
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
)
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)
(
dFΘ−i(θ−i|θ′i)− dFΘ−i(θ−i|θi)
)
Since ui(θi, a−i, ai) has increasing differences (ID) in (θi; ai) for each a−i ∈ A−i and since ID is
preserved under integration, the first term
∫
Θ−i×S−i
(
uiai
(
θ′i, α−i(s−i), ai
)
− uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
))
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)dFΘ−i(θ−i|θ′i) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, since ui(θi, a−i, ai) has ID in (a−i; ai) for each θi ∈ Θi, uiai(θi, a−i, ai) is increasing
in a−i. As α−i is a monotone strategy, by (A.13) and (A.6), the second term∫
Θ−i×S−i
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), ai
)
dF (s−i|θ−i; ρ−i)
(
dFΘ−i(θ−i|θ′i)− dFΘ−i(θ−i|θi)
)
≥ 0.
Hence, u˜i(θi, ai) is supermodular in (θi, ai). A similar argument establishes that u˜
i
ai
(θi, ai) is
supermodular in (θi, ai). Thus, u˜
i ∈ U↑. The desired result in the statement of the lemma
follows by Theorem 1.
Lemma 4 Fix some arbitrary strategy α−i ∈ A−i. Consider two information structures (Σρi ,Σρ′−i)
and (Σρi ,Σρ′′−i) with ρ
′′
−i MIO ρ′−i. If ui ∈ Γ↑, then aBRi (α−i, ρi, ρ′′−i) is more responsive with a
higher mean than aBRi (α−i, ρi, ρ
′
−i).
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Proof. Following the same first order condition argument we used in the proof of Theorem 1,
we get the expression(
aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)− aBRi (si;α−i, ρ′′)
)∫
Θ×S−i
−uiaiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)
dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Bˆ(si)
+
∫
Θ×S−i
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)(
dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ′′)− dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ′)
)
≤ 0.
Then, for each t ∈ [0, 1],∫ 1
t
(
aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)− aBRi (si;α−i, ρ′′)
)
dsi
≤
∫ 1
t
Bˆ(si)
−1
∫
Θ×S−i
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)(
dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ′)− dF (θ, s−i|si; ρ′′)
)
dsi
=
∫
Θ×S
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)
Bˆ(si)
−1
1[si≥t]
(
dF (θ, s; ρ′)− dF (θ, s; ρ′′)
)
.
For a given information structure Σρ,
F (θ, s; ρ) =
∫ θ−i
θ−i
∫ s−i
0
F (θi, si|ω−i; ρ)dF (ω−i, x−i; ρ−i)
where the equality follows from (A.11). Let
ψˆ(θ−i, s−i; t) =
∫
Θi×Si
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)
Bˆ(si)
−1
1[si≥t]dF (θi, si|θ−i; ρ)
so that ∫ 1
t
(
aBRi (si;α−i, ρ
′)− aBRi (si;α−i, ρ′′)
)
dsi
≤
∫
Θ−i×S−i
ψˆ(θ−i, s−i; t)
(
dF (θ−i, s−i; ρ′−i)− dF (θ−i, s−i; ρ′′−i)
)
.
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Take s′−i > s−i which implies that α−i(s
′
−i) ≥ α−i(s−i). Then,[
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s′−i), a
BR
i (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)− uiai(θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ′))
]
1[si≥t] ≥ 0,
for all (θi, si) ∈ Θi×Si because ui has increasing differences in (ai; a−i). It is also increasing in
both θi and si because u
i
ai
has increasing differences in (θi; a−i) and (ai; a−i). Similarly,
Bˆ(si)
−1 ≥ 0
by concavity of ui in ai and it is increasing in si because u
i
ai
has ID in (θi; ai) and (ai; a−i), and
because F (θ, s−i|si) is increasing in FOSD as si increases. Thus, along with (A.6) and (A.13),
ψˆ(θ−i, s′−i; t)− ψˆ(θ−i, s−i; t)
=
∫
Θi×Si
[
uiai
(
θi, α−i(s′−i), a
BR
i (si;α−i, ρ
′)
)− uiai(θi, α−i(s−i), aBRi (si;α−i, ρ′))
]
× Bˆ(si)−11[si≥t]dF (θi, si|θ−i; ρ)
is increasing in θ−i. In other words, ψˆ(θ−i, s−i; t) is supermodular in (θ−i, s−i). By Lemma 2,
ρ′′−i MIO ρ′−i implies∫
Θ−i×S−i
ψˆ(θ−i, s−i; t)
(
dF (θ−i, s−i; ρ′−i)− dF (θ−i, s−i; ρ′′−i)
)
≤ 0,
giving us the desired result.
Lemma 5 Fix Σρ. Let α
′′
−i, α
′
−i ∈ A−i such that α′′−i is more responsive with higher mean than
α′−i. If u
i ∈ Γ↑, then, aBRi (α′′−i, ρ) is more responsive with a higher mean than aBRi (α′−i, ρ).
Proof. Suppress the dependence on ρ as it is held fixed. For any t ∈ [0, 1], we use the first order
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conditions argument (similar to the proof of Lemma 4) to get the expression∫ 1
t
(
aBRi (si;α
′
−i)− aBRi (si;α′′−i)
)
dsi
≤
∫ 1
t
{(
−
∫
Θ×S−i
uiaiai
(
θ, α′′−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
dF (θ, s−i|si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,B˜i(si)
)−1
×
∫
Θ×S−i
[
uiai
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
− uiai
(
θi, α
′′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)]
dF (θ, s−i|si)
}
dsi.
Since uiai is continuous and increasing in a−i (by ID of u
i in (a−i; ai)), it is differentiable in a−i
almost everywhere. By convexity of uiai in a−i,
uiai
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
− uiai
(
θi, α
′′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
≤uiaia−i
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)(
α′−i(s−i)− α′′−i(s−i)
)
.
Thus,∫ 1
t
(
aBRi (si;α
′
−i)− aBRi (si;α′′−i)
)
dsi
≤
∫
S−i
(
α′−i(s−i)− α′′−i(s−i)
) ∫
Θ×Si
uiaia−i
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
B˜(si)
−1
1[si≥t]dF (θ, si|s−i)ds−i.
We make use of the following result from Quah and Strulovici (2009)
Lemma 6 Let g : [x′, x′′]→ R and h : [x′, x′′]→ R be integrable functions.
1. If g is increasing and
∫ x′′
x
h(t)dt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [x′, x′′], then ∫ x′′
x′ g(t)h(t)dt ≥ g(x′)
∫ x′′
x′ h(t)dt
2. If g is decreasing and
∫ x
x′ h(t)dt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ [x′, x′′], then
∫ x′′
x′ g(t)h(t)dt ≥ g(x′′)
∫ x′′
x′ h(t)dt
Proof. Quah and Strulovici (2009) Lemma 1
By using the definition of responsiveness in Lemma 1 and the equivalence of the monotone
strategy α−i with its quantile function, α′′−i is more responsive with a higher mean than α
′
−i if,
and only if, ∫ 1
t
(
α′−i(s−i)− α′′−i(s−i)
)
ds−i ≤ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, 1].
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Furthermore,
uiaia−i
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
1[si≥t] ≥ 0, ∀(θi, si) ∈ Θi × Si
as ui has increasing differences in (ai; a−i) for all θi ∈ Θi. It is also increasing in both θi and si
because uiai has increasing differences in (θi; a−i) and (ai; a−i). Similarly,
B˜(si)
−1 ≥ 0
by concavity of ui in ai and it is increasing in si because u
i
ai
has ID in (θi; ai) and (ai; a−i), and
because F (θ, s−i|si) is increasing in FOSD as si increases. Thus, along with (A.6) and (A.13),∫
Θ×Si
uiaia−i
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
B˜(si)
−1
1[si≥t]dF (θ, si|s−i)
is an increasing function of s−i. Applying Lemma 6, we have∫ 1
t
(
aBRi (si;α
′
−i)− aBRi (si;α′′−i)
)
dsi
≤
∫
S−i
(
α′−i(s−i)− α′′−i(s−i)
) ∫
Θ×Si
uiaia−i
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
B˜(si)
−1
1[si≥t]dF (θ, si|s−i)ds−i
≤
∫
S−i
(
α′−i(s−i)− α′′−i(s−i)
)
ds−i︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
∫
Θ×Si
uiaia−i
(
θi, α
′
−i(s−i), a
BR
i (si;α
′
−i)
)
B˜(si)
−1
1[si≥t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
dF (θ, si|0)
≤0
for each t ∈ [0, 1].
We will now tackle the last step in the proof: comparative statics of the BNEs. We apply the
comparative statics of fixed points provided by Villas-Boas (1997). To do so, we will need the
following definition.
Definition 1 (Contractible Space) Let X be a topological space. We say that X is a con-
tractible space if there exists a map Φ : X × [0, 1]→ X such that for all x ∈ X
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1. Φ(·, λ) is continuous in λ,
2. Φ(x, 0) = x and Φ(x, 1) = x∗ for some x∗ ∈ X
Intuitively, X is contractible if it can be continuously shrunk into a point inside itself.
Theorem 6, Villas-Boas (1997): Let X be a compact subset of a Banach space. Consider
continuous mappings T1 : X → X and T2 : X → X, and a transitive and reflexive order  on
X. For all x ∈ X, let the upper-set {x′ ∈ X : x′  x} be a compact and contractible subset.
Let both T1 and T2 have a fixed point on X. Suppose x
′  x ⇒ T1(x′)  T1(x), and suppose
T1(x)  T2(x) for all x ∈ X. Then for every fixed point x?2 of T2, there is a fixed point x?1 of T1
such that x?1  x?2.
The remaining few steps prove that our setting satisfies the assumptions needed to apply the
Villas-Boas result.22 Let BV ([0, 1]) be the space of functions of bounded variation from [0, 1] to
R. Given a function g ∈ BV ([0, 1]), let V (g) be the total variation of g.23 Define the bounded
variation norm by ||g||BV =
∫ 1
0
|g(s)|ds+V (g). The space BV ([0, 1]) equipped with the || · ||BV
is a Banach space.
Fix a player i ∈ N . Any αi ∈ Ai is both uniformly bounded and is of bounded variation as it
is an increasing function with V (αi) = αi(1)− αi(0) ≤ a¯i − ai <∞. Therefore, Ai is a subset
of BV ([0, 1]).
Lemma 7 Ai is a compact subset of BV ([0, 1]).
Proof. We first show that Ai is a closed subset BV ([0, 1]). Take a sequence {α˜i,k}∞k=1 ∈ Ai
that converges to α˜i ∈ BV ([0, 1]) in the || · ||BV norm. Thus, α˜i,k converges point-wise to α˜i
almost everywhere. The point-wise limit of monotone functions is also monotone. Furthermore,
as ai ≤ α˜i,k(0) for all k, the limit also satisfies ai ≤ α˜i(0). Similarly, as a¯i ≥ α˜i,k(1) for all
k, the limit also satisfies a¯i ≥ α˜i(1). Finally, the point-wise limit of measurable functions is
measurable (Corollary 8.9, Measure, Integrals, and Martingales, Schilling, 2005). As α˜i is a
monotone and measurable function that maps from [0, 1] to Ai, a˜i ∈ Ai.
22For the case when ui ∈ Γ↓ for all i ∈ N , we use Theorem 7 of Villas-Boas (1997) which uses the lower-sets
generated by responsiveness with a lower mean to get the desired comparative statics of fixed points.
23Specifically, V (g) = supp∈P
∑np−1
i=0 |g(xi+1)−g(xi)| where P is the set of all partitions p = {x0, x1, . . . , xnp}
on [0, 1].
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Now, consider any sequence {αi,k}∞k=1 ∈ Ai ⊂ BV ([0, 1]). Using, Helly’s Selection Theorem,
there exists a subsequence {αi,km}km ∈ Ai that converges point-wise to a limit αi ∈ BV ([0, 1]).
Notice that
||αi,km − αi||BV =
∫ 1
0
∣∣αi,km(s)− αi(s)∣∣ds+ V (αi,km − αi)
≤
∫ 1
0
∣∣αi,km(s)− αi(s)∣∣ds+ V (αi,km)− V (αi)
=
∫ 1
0
∣∣αi,km(s)− αi(s)∣∣ds+ (αi,km(1)− αi,km(0))− (αi(1)− αi(0))
where the inequality follows from the sub-additive property of the total variation function, i.e.,
V (g1 + g2) ≤ V (g1) + V (g2), and the equality follows as both αi,km and the point-wise limit
αi are increasing functions. By the dominated convergence theorem,
∫ 1
0
∣∣αi,km(s) − αi(s)∣∣ds
converges to zero as km goes to infinity. Similarly, αi,km(1)−αi(1) and αi,km(0)−αi(0) converge
to zero as km goes to infinity. Hence, αi,km converges to αi in || · ||BV . As Ai is closed, αi ∈ Ai.
Therefore, Ai is (sequentially) compact.
Define a partial order over Ai by α′i i αi if, and only if, α′i is more responsive with a higher
mean than αi. Denote the upper-set of ai by US(αi) = {α′i ∈ Ai : α′i i αi} ⊆ Ai.
Lemma 8 For any αi ∈ Ai, the upper-set US(αi) is a compact and contractible set.
Proof. For some αi ∈ Ai, the upper-set, US(αi), is a closed subset of Ai (follows from the
dominated convergence Theorem). Hence, it is compact. To show that US(αi) is contractible,
let αci : [0, 1]→ Ai be the constant function with αci(s) = a¯i for all s ∈ [0, 1]. Note that αci ∈ Ai.
Furthermore, αci(s) ≥ αi(s), ∀s ∈ [0, 1] which implies αci i αi ⇒ αci ∈ US(αi).
For each αi ∈ Ai, defne the mapping Φ : US(αi)× [0, 1]→ US(αi) such that
Φ(α′i, λ) = (1− λ)α′i + λαci .
Φ(·, λ) is continuous in λ. As λ increases from 0 to 1, Φ continuously deforms any strategy in
US(αi) to the constant strategy αci , which is itself in US(αi). Therefore, US(αi) is contractible.
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We therefore have an order, %i, on Ai (which is a subset of a Banach space) that generates
compact and contractible upper-sets. We extend these properties to A = ×Ii=1Ai by the product
order: given α, α′ ∈ A, α′  α if, and only if, α′i i αi for all i ∈ N . Along with the product
topology,  is an order on A that generates compact and contractible upper-sets.24
Consider a Bayesian game Gρ = (Σρ, G). Define an operator Tρ : A → A with
Tρ(α) =
(
aBR1 (α−1, ρ), a
BR
2 (α−2, ρ), . . . , a
BR
n (α−n, ρ)
)
.
Tρ is continuous in α as utility functions are continuous in actions. A monotone BNE of Gρ is
a fixed point of Tρ. We know such a fixed point exists (Van Zandt and Vives (2007).
Now consider two different games, Gρ′′ = (Σρ′′ , G) and Gρ′ = (Σρ′ , G), with ρ′′ MIO ρ′. From
Lemma 5,
α′  α⇔ α′i i αi,∀i ∈ N ⇒ aBRi (α′−i, ρ′′) i aBRi (α−i, ρ′′),∀i ∈ N ⇔ Tρ′′(α′)  Tρ′′(α).
From Lemma 3 and 4,
ρ′′ MIO ρ′ ⇒ aBRi (α−i, ρ′′) i aBRi (α−i, ρ′),∀i ∈ N ⇔ Tρ′′(α)  Tρ′(α)
for all α ∈ A. We can now directly apply Theorem 6 of Villas-Boas (1997) to conclude that,
for every fixed point a?(ρ′) of Tρ′ , there is a fixed point a?(ρ′′) of Tρ′′ such that a?(ρ′′)  a?(ρ′).
Proof of Proposition 3
24A is a subset of a Banach space equipped with the metric d(α′, α) = ∑i ||α′i − αi||BV .
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Proof. Take any two information structures Σρ′ , Σρ′′ ∈ P with ρ′′ MIO ρ′. Then,
U1(ρ
′′)− U1(ρ′)
=
∫
Θ
∫
S
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′′), a?2(s; ρ
′′)
)
dF (s|θ; ρ′′)µo(dθ)−
∫
Θ
∫
S
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′), a?2(s; ρ
′)
)
dF (s|θ; ρ′)µo(dθ)
=
∫
Θ
∫
S
(
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′′), a?2(s; ρ
′′)
)− u1(θ, a?1(θ; ρ′), a?2(s; ρ′′)))dF (s|θ; ρ′′)µo(dθ)
+
∫
Θ
∫
S
(
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′), a?2(s; ρ
′′)
)− u1(θ, a?1(θ; ρ′), a?2(s; ρ′)))dF (s|θ; ρ′′)µo(dθ)
+
∫
Θ
∫
S
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′), a?2(s; ρ
′)
))(
dF (s|θ; ρ′′)− dF (s|θ; ρ′)
)
µo(dθ).
The first term is non-negative as a?1(ρ
′′) is player 1’s best response to a?2(ρ
′′) and information
structure Σρ′′ . After changing the order of integration, the second term can be rewritten as∫
S
∫
Θ
v1(θ)a?1(θ; ρ
′)µ(dθ|s; ρ)
(
a?2(s; ρ
′′)− a?2(s; ρ′)
)
ds.
By (A.12), ∫
Θ
v1(θ)a?1(θ; ρ
′)µ(dθ|s; ρ)
is increasing in s. Furthermore, because ui ∈ Γ↑ for i = 1, 2, by Theorem 2, ρ′′ MIO ρ′ implies
a?2(ρ
′′) is more responsive with a higher mean than a?2(ρ
′). By Lemma 1,∫ 1
t
(
a?2(s; ρ
′′)− a?2(s; ρ′)
)
ds ≥ 0
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma 6 (Lemma 1 from Quah and Strulovici (2009)), the second term is
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then ∫
S
∫
Θ
v1(θ)a?1(θ; ρ
′)µ(dθ|s; ρ)
(
a?2(s; ρ
′′)− a?2(s; ρ′)
)
ds
≥
∫
Θ
v1(θ)a?1(θ; ρ
′)µ(dθ|0; ρ)
∫
S
(
a?2(s; ρ
′′)− a?2(s; ρ′)
)
ds ≥ 0.
For the third term, take s′′ > s′ and note that
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′), a?2(s
′′; ρ′)
)− u1(θ, a?1(θ; ρ′), a?2(s′; ρ′))
=v1(θ)a?1(θ; ρ
′)
(
a?2(s
′′; ρ′)− a?2(s′; ρ′)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
is increasing in θ. Hence, u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′), a?2(s; ρ
′)
)
is supermodular in (θ, s). By Lemma 2,∫
Θ×S
u1
(
θ, a?1(θ; ρ
′), a?2(s; ρ
′)
)(
dF (s|θ; ρ′′)− dF (s|θ; ρ′)
)
µo(dθ) ≥ 0.
Thus, ρ′′ MIO ρ′ implies U1(ρ′′) ≥ U1(ρ′). As ρ¯ MIO ρ for all ρ ∈ P , player 1’s ex-ante payoff
is maximized by the full-information structure.
6.3 Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Notice that we can rewrite U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρˆ; ρˆ) as
U1(ρ; ρˆ)− U1(ρˆ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of covert information
+U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρ; ρˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=V T (ρ;ρˆ)
.
Amir and Lazzati, (2016, Proposition 7) show that the first term is non-negative when ρ1 MIO
ρˆ1, i.e., the value of covert information is non-negative when quality of information increases.
Hence, if V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0, we can conclude that the value of overt information is also non-negative
when quality of information increases.
Proof of Proposition 5
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Proof. Suppose Σρc1 6= Σρo1 (otherwise, it is trivial). By definition,
U1(ρ
c; ρc)− κ(ρc1) ≥ U1(ρo; ρc)− κ(ρo1)
and
U1(ρ
o; ρo)− κ(ρo1) ≥ U1(ρc; ρc)− κ(ρc1).
Combining the two inequalities, we get
U1(ρ
o; ρo)− U1(ρo; ρc) = V T (ρo; ρc) ≥ 0⇔ ρo1 MIO ρc1.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We only show the proof for the case when u1(θ1, a) is an increasing and convex function
of a2 and a
∗
2(·) becomes more responsive with a higher mean as information quality increases.
A similar argument applies when u1(θ1, a) is a decreasing concave function of a2, and a
∗
2(·)
becomes more responsive with a lower mean as information quality increases.
(=⇒) Suppose ρ1 MIO ρˆ1 and a?2(ρ) is more responsive with a higher mean than a?2(ρˆ).
V T (ρ; ρˆ) = U1(ρ; ρ)− U1(ρ; ρˆ) is given by∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)− u1(θ1, aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ), a?2(s2; ρˆ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)
=
∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)− u1(θ1, aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ), a?2(s2; ρ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by optimality
+
∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)− u1(θ1, aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ), a?2(s2; ρˆ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)
≥
∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)− u1(θ1, aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ), a?2(s2; ρˆ))]dF (θ, s; ρ).
Suppose u1 is an increasing convex function of a2. Note that u
1
a2
≥ 0 implies that player 2’s
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actions have positive externalities on player 1’s payoff. By convexity,∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)− u1(θ1, aBR1 (s1; a?2(ρˆ), ρ), a?2(s2; ρˆ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)
≥
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)ds2.
If states are independently distributed across players, given (A.11),∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)ds2
=
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)
ds2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by responsiveness
with a higher mean
∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by positive externalities
dF (θ1, s1; ρ1) ≥ 0.
If u1(θ1, a) has ID in (θ1; a2), then∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)
in an increasing function of s2. From Lemma 1, responsiveness with a higher mean is equivalent
to ∫ 1
t
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)
ds2 ≥ 0
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Using Lemma 6, we can then conclude that∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)ds2
≥
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρ)− a?2(s2; ρˆ)
)
ds2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by responsiveness
with a higher mean
∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(0; ρˆ)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by positive externalities
dF (θ1, s1|0; ρ) ≥ 0.
In either case, we get the desired result that V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0.
(⇐=) Suppose ρ1 MIO ρˆ1 =⇒ ρˆ1 MIO ρ1 because P is a totally ordered set of information
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structures. By assumption, a?2(ρˆ) is more responsive with a higher mean than a
?
2(ρ). Then,
−V T (ρ; ρˆ) = U1(ρ; ρˆ)− U1(ρ; ρ) is given by∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)− u1(θ1, a?1(s1; ρ), a?2(s2; ρ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)
=
∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
BR
1 (s1; a
?
2(ρˆ), ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)− u1(θ1, a?1(s1; ρ), a?2(s2; ρˆ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by optimality
+
∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)− u1(θ1, a?1(s1; ρ), a?2(s2; ρ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)
≥
∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)− u1(θ1, a?1(s1; ρ), a?2(s2; ρ))]dF (θ, s; ρ).
Suppose u1 is an increasing convex function of a2. By convexity,∫
Θ×S
[
u1
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρˆ)
)− u1(θ1, a?1(s1; ρ), a?2(s2; ρ))]dF (θ, s; ρ)
≥
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρˆ)− a?2(s2; ρ)
)∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)ds2.
If states are independently distributed across players, then by (A.11),∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρˆ)− a?2(s2; ρ)
)∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)ds2
=
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρˆ)− a?2(s2; ρ)
)
ds2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by responsiveness
with a higher mean
∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by positive externalities
dF (θ1, s1; ρ1) ≥ 0.
If u1(θ1, a) has ID in (θ1; a2), then∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)
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in an increasing function of s2. From Lemma 1, responsiveness with a higher mean is equivalent
to ∫ 1
t
(
a?2(s2; ρˆ)− a?2(s2; ρ)
)
ds2 ≥ 0
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Using Lemma 6, we can then conclude that∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρˆ)− a?2(s2; ρ)
)∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(s2; ρ)
)
dF (θ1, s1|s2; ρ)ds2
≥
∫
S2
(
a?2(s2; ρˆ)− a?2(s2; ρ)
)
ds2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by responsiveness
∫
Θ1×S1
u1a2
(
θ1, a
?
1(s1; ρ), a
?
2(0; ρ)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by positive externalities
dF (θ1, s1|0; ρ) ≥ 0.
In either case, we get the desired result that −V T (ρ; ρˆ) ≥ 0.
6.4 Blackwell, Lehmann, and Monotone Information Order
It is natural to ask why the monotone information order is the relevant order to consider
instead of the more familiar Blackwell informativeness (Blackwell, 1951, 1953) or the Lehmann
(accuracy) order (Lehmann, 1988). The answer is two-fold: The first reason for focusing on
the monotone information order has to do with the value of information in the class of decision
problems we consider. Blackwell (1951, 1953) shows that all decision makers value a higher
quality of information if, and only if, information quality is ranked by Blackwell informativeness.
Athey and Levin (2017) show that if the class of decision problems is restricted to supermodular
preferences, then a higher quality of information is valuable if, and only if, information quality
is ranked by the more general monotone information order. Our results further solidify the link
between the class of supermodular payoffs and the monotone information order by providing
conditions on the marginal utilities of supermodular payoff functions such that, agents are more
responsive when information quality increases if, and only if, information quality is ranked by
the monotone information order.
Second, within the class of information structures that satisfy (A.5), the monotone information
order is a more general ordering than Blackwell informativeness and the Lehmann ordering. In
particular, if information structures satisfy the MLRP property (a stronger assumption than
(A.5)), then Blackwell informativeness implies the Lehmann order which in turn implies the
monotone information order. The converse however is not true, as shown by the example below.
Figure 7 depicts the nesting of information orders and the associated class of decision problems.
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Montone Information Order
Lehmann Order
Blackwell Order
All decision problems
Single crossing utility
Supermodular
utility
Figure 7: Information ordering and decision problems
The following is an example of information structures that can be ordered using the monotone
information order but not the Lehmann order.25 For this section only, we consider information
structures Σρ ,
(
S, {F (·|θ; ρ)}θ∈Θ
)
such that {F (·|θ; ρ)}θ∈Θ satisfies the MLRP property, i.e.,
for any s < s′, the likelihood function
f(s′|θ; ρ)
f(s|θ; ρ)
is non-decreasing in θ.26
Lehmann (Accuracy) Order: Σρ′′ dominates Σρ′ in the Lehmann order, denoted ρ
′′ L ρ′,
if for all s ∈ S,
F−1
(
F (s|θ; ρ′)∣∣θ; ρ′′)
is non-decreasing in θ.
Example: Let θ ∈ {θ1, θ2, θ3} with θ1 < θ2 < θ3. Let µoi be the mass at θi with µo1 = µo2 = 25
and µo3 =
1
5
. Consider two information structure Σρ′ and Σρ′′ such that the signal space S is
the unit interval for both structures and F (s|θi; ρ′) is given by
25See Lehmann (1988), Persico (2000), and Jewitt (2007) for a more complete analysis of the Lehmann
ordering.
26This is a more restrictive assumption on signal structures than (A.5).
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0 ≤ s < 1/2 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1
θ1 s
3
2
1+s
2
θ2 s s
θ3 0 2s− 1
while F (s|θi; ρ′′) is given by For both information structures, the marginal on the signal is
0 ≤ s < 1/2 1/2 ≤ s ≤ 1
θ1 2s 1
θ2
s
2
3s−1
2
θ3 0 2s− 1
simply the uniform distribution on S = [0, 1], i.e., FS(s; ρ
′) = Fs(s; ρ′′) = s for all s ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, both structures satisfy the MLRP property: for any s < s′ < 1/2 or 1/2 ≤ s < s′,
the likelihood functions satisfy
f(s′|θi; ρ′)
f(s|θi; ρ′) =
f(s′|θi; ρ′′)
f(s|θi; ρ′′) = 1 ∀i = 1, 2, 3,
while for any s < 1/2 ≤ s′, the likelihood ratios satisfy
f(s′|θ1; ρ′)
f(s|θ1; ρ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1/3
<
f(s′|θ2; ρ′)
f(s|θ2; ρ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
<
f(s′|θ3; ρ′)
f(s|θ3; ρ′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∞
,
and
f(s′|θ1; ρ′′)
f(s|θ1; ρ′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
<
f(s′|θ2; ρ′′)
f(s|θ2; ρ′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=3
<
f(s′|θ3; ρ′′)
f(s|θ3; ρ′′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=∞
.
As a result, s′ > s implies µ(·|s′; ρ) FOSD µ(·|s; ρ), for ρ = ρ′, ρ′′ (Milgrom; 1981).
We first show that ρ′ L ρ′′ and ρ′′ L ρ′. If ρ′ L ρ′′, then
F−1
(
F (s|θ; ρ′′)∣∣θ; ρ′)
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must be increasing in θ for every s ∈ [0, 1]. However, for all s ∈ [0, 1]
F−1
(
F (s|θ3; ρ′′)
∣∣θ3; ρ′) = s
whereas
F−1
(
F (s|θ1; ρ′′)
∣∣θ1; ρ′) ≥ F−1(F (s|θ1; ρ′)∣∣θ1; ρ′) = s
since F (s|θ1; ρ′′) ≥ F (s|θ1; ρ′). Similarly,
F−1
(
F (s|θ2; ρ′′)
∣∣θ2; ρ′) ≤ F−1(F (s|θ2; ρ′)∣∣θ2; ρ′) = s
because F (s|θ2; ρ′′) ≤ F (s|θ2; ρ′). Altogether, we have
F−1
(
F (·|θ2; ρ′′)
∣∣θ2; ρ′) < F−1(F (·|θ3; ρ′′)∣∣θ3; ρ′) < F−1(F (·|θ1; ρ′′)∣∣θ1; ρ′)
violating the Lehmann monotonicity condition. Thus, ρ′ L ρ′′.
Figure 8 depicts the conditional distributions of the signals. The solid black line is the con-
ditional distribution of signals given θ3 under both Σρ′ and Σρ′′ . The solid and dashed blue
lines are the conditional distribution of signals given θ1 under Σρ′ and Σρ′′ respectively. Sim-
ilarly, solid and dashed red lines are the conditional distribution of signals given θ2 under
Σρ′ and Σρ′′ respectively. Starting from s
∗ ∈ [0, 1], the arrows show the transformation to
τi = F
−1
(
F (s∗|θi; ρ′′)
∣∣θi; ρ′) where the blue, red, and black arrows correspond to θ1, θ2, and θ3
respectively. Similarly, If ρ′′ L ρ′, then
F−1
(
F (s|θ; ρ′)∣∣θ; ρ′′)
must be increasing in θ for every s ∈ [0, 1]. However, for all s ∈ [0, 1],
F−1
(
F (s|θ3; ρ′)
∣∣θ3; ρ′′) = s
whereas
F−1
(
F (s|θ1; ρ′)
∣∣θ1; ρ′′) ≤ F−1(F (s|θ1; ρ′′)∣∣θ1; ρ′′) = s,
and
F−1
(
F (s|θ2; ρ′)
∣∣θ2; ρ′′) ≥ F−1(F (s|θ2; ρ′′)∣∣θ2; ρ′′) = s.
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θ1, ρ′′
θ1, ρ′
θ2, ρ′
θ2, ρ′′
θ3, ρ′′, ρ′
1︸︷︷︸
=τ1
1
F (s|θ; ρ)
s
1
4
3
4
s∗︸︷︷︸
=τ3
1
2
τ2
Figure 8: ρ′ L ρ′′
Altogether, we have
F−1
(
F (·|θ1; ρ′)
∣∣θ1; ρ′′) < F−1(F (·|θ3; ρ′)∣∣θ3; ρ′′) < F−1(F (·|θ2; ρ′)∣∣θ2; ρ′′)
violating the Lehmann monotonicity condition. Thus, ρ′′ L ρ′. Furthermore, Σρ′′ and Σρ′ are
also not Blackwell ordered since Blackwell ordering implies Lehmann ordering (within the class
of information structures with MLRP property).
Figure 9 depicts the conditional distributions of the signals. The solid black line is the con-
ditional distribution of signals given θ3 under both Σρ′ and Σρ′′ . The solid and dashed blue
lines are the conditional distribution of signals given θ1 under Σρ′ and Σρ′′ respectively. Sim-
ilarly, solid and dashed red lines are the conditional distribution of signals given θ2 under
Σρ′ and Σρ′′ respectively. Starting from s
∗ ∈ [0, 1], the arrows show the transformation to
τ˜i = F
−1
(
F (s∗|θi; ρ′)
∣∣θi; ρ′′) where the blue, red, and black arrows correspond to θ1, θ2, and θ3
respectively.
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Figure 9: ρ′′ L ρ′
Next, we show that ρ′′ MIO ρ′. From Lemma 2, ρ′′ MIO ρ′ if F (θi, s; ρ′)−F (θi, s; ρ′′) ≤ 0 for
all (θi, s). Notice that for all s ∈ [0, 1],
F (θ1, s; ρ
′)− F (θ1, s; ρ′′) = µo1
(
F (s|θ1; ρ′)− F (s|θ1; ρ′′)
)
≤ 0.
Furthermore, for all s ∈ [0, 1],
F (θ2, s; ρ
′)− F (θ2, s; ρ′′) =µo1
(
F (s|θ1; ρ′)− F (s|θ1; ρ′′)
)
+ µo2
(
F (s|θ2; ρ′)− F (s|θ2; ρ′′)
)
=
2
5
(
F (s|θ1; ρ′)− F (s|θ1; ρ′′) + F (s|θ2; ρ′)− F (s|θ2; ρ′′)
)
= 0.
Finally, F (θ3, s; ρ
′)−F (θ3, s; ρ′′) =
∑3
i=1 µ
o
i
(
F (s|θi; ρ′)−F (s|θi; ρ′′)
)
= FS(s; ρ
′)−FS(s; ρ′′) = 0.
Hence, ρ′′ MIO ρ′.
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